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Abstract
In an important but thus far unnoticed development, federal courts have created a new series of
“default principles” for statutory interpretation, authorizing regulatory agencies, when statutes are unclear,
(a) to exempt trivial risks from regulation and thus to develop a kind of common law of “acceptable risks,”
(b) to take account of substitute risks created by regulation, and thus to engage in “health-health” tradeoffs,
(c) to consider whether compliance with regulation is feasible, (d) to take costs into account, and (e) to
engage in cost-benefit balancing, and thus to develop a kind of common law of cost-benefit analysis. These
cost-benefit default principles are both legitimate and salutary, because they give rationality and sense the
benefit of the doubt. At the same time, they leave many open questions. They do not say whether agencies
are required, and not merely permitted, to go in the direction they indicate; they do not indicate when
agencies might reasonably reject the principles; and they do not say what, specifically, will be counted as an
“acceptable” risk or a sensible form of cost-benefit analysis. Addressing the open questions, this Article
urges that the principles should ordinarily be taken as mandatory, not merely permissive; that agencies may
reject them in certain identifiable circumstances; and that steps should be taken toward quantitative analysis
of the effects of regulation, designed to discipline the relevant inquiries. An understanding of these points
should promote understanding of emerging “second generation” debates, involving not whether to adopt a
presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing, but when the presumption is rebutted, and what, in
particular, cost-benefit analysis should be taken to entail.

“Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless
expenditures of effort. . . . Unless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis
for an implication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens of regulation
yield a gain of trivial or no value.”1
“It seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health would . . . lock the
agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s health effects in determining the maximum
level of that substance.”2

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School and
Department of Political Science. I am grateful to Elizabeth Garrett, Robert Hahn, Eric Posner, and
Richard Posner for helpful comments on a previous draft.
1 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (DC Cir 1979).
2 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027, 1052 (DC Cir 1999).
*
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“It is only where there is ‘clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost’
that we find agencies barred from considering costs.”3
"In order better to achieve regulatory goals - for example, to allocate resources so that
they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment - regulators must often take account of all
of a proposed regulation's adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious and
disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being equal, we should read
silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this
type of rational regulation."4
“The rule-implicit valuation of a life is high – about $4 million – but not so astronomical,
certainly by regulatory standards, as to call the rationality of the rule seriously into question,
especially when we consider that neither Hepatis B nor AIDS is a disease of old people. These
diseases are no respecters of youth; they cut off people in their working years, and thus in their
prime, and it is natural to set a high value on the lost years.”5

I.

Introduction

Risks never exist in isolation. They are part of systems. For that reason,
any effort to reduce a single risk will have a range of consequences, some of them
likely unintended.
If the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) increases security at
airports, so as to make flying safer, it will also make flying less convenient and
more expensive, and thus lead some people to drive instead.6 Flying is much
safer than driving, and hence the FAA’s measures might increase the number of
lives lost on balance. If noise levels are reduced at the Grand Canyon, so that
people can enjoy the area in peace and quiet, air tourism there will have to be
dramatically reduced, so that fewer people can enjoy the area at all.7 If the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration increases regulation of benzene,
a carcinogenic substance, it might lead companies to use an unsafe and perhaps a
less safe substitute; it might also decrease wages of affected workers, and
decrease the number of jobs in the relevant industry. People who have less
money, and who are unemployed, tend to live shorter lives -- and hence
occupational regulation might, under certain circumstances, sacrifice more lives

Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (DC Cir 2000).
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (Feb. 27. 2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
5 American Dental Association v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1993).
6 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety, 20 Harv. . L. & Pub. Policy 791 (1997).
7 Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (DC Cir 1998).
3
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than it saves.8 Of course the unintended consequences of risk regulation might be
desirable rather than undesirable – as, for example, where regulation spurs new
pollution control technologies.
Now consider the following cases:
1. The Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to issue standards controlling any substance that “contributes
significantly” to pollution problems in certain areas. EPA issues
regulations governing relevant pollutants, but without considering the
costs of compliance. Industries challenge the regulations on the ground
that cost is a statutorily relevant factor.9
2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is
asked to promote fuel economy in automobiles “to the extent feasible.”
NHTSA issues fuel economy standards that are admittedly feasible, in
the sense that no one doubts that they are technologically and
economically possible. But the Coalition for Automobile Safety, a
public interest organization, contends that the effect of the standards
will be to lead manufacturers to produce smaller and more dangerous
cars. The Coalition contends that NHTSA acted unlawfully in failing to
take this effect into account.10
3. A federal statute requires the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to regulate toxic substances “to the extent feasible.”11
OSHA interprets this language to require it to consider whether the
regulation is technologically feasible and whether it is “practicable,”
economically speaking, for the industry to comply. OSHA imposes a
regulation that is admittedly “feasible” under this test; but the statute
cannot pass a cost-benefit test, because the benefits are low and the
costs are high. Insisting that costs should be compared with benefits,
industries subject to the regulation complain that it is unlawful.12
See Symposium, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1994).
Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (DC Cir 2000) (finding cost a permissible factor for the
agency to consider under a similar statute; Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980)
(finding cost an irrelevant factor under provisions governing national ambient air quality
standards).
10 See Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (DC Cir. 1992).
11 29 USC 655(b)(5).
12 ATMI v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
8
9

4

Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis

In which of these cases has the agency acted unlawfully? The question is
of immense importance, both for regulatory policy and for the relationship
between courts and agencies. One of my main purposes here is to demonstrate
that federal law has now built a novel set of rules for statutory construction: the
cost-benefit default principles. In brief, these principles (1) allow de minimis
exceptions to regulatory requirements; (2) authorize agencies to permit
“acceptable” risks, departing from a requirement of “absolute” safety; (3) permit
agencies to take account of both costs and feasibility; and (4) allow agencies to
balance costs against benefits. Taken as a whole, the cost-benefit default
principles are making a substantial difference to regulatory policy, both because
of their effects in litigated cases and because of their systemic consequences for
regulation.13
Even when thus specified, however, the default principles raise many
questions. For the most part, the cost-benefit default principles say what agencies
are permitted to do. It is not clear whether the default principles also mean that
where statutes are ambiguous, agencies will be required to do any of these
things. Nor do the principles give much indication of how agencies permitting
”acceptable” risks, or engaging in cost-benefit analysis, might be expected to
proceed. What does it mean to say that agencies are permitted to “consider”
costs? Would it be unlawful for an agency to say that even very high costs are
worth incurring? In what way should the monetary valuation of human life be
constrained? What counts as an acceptable or de minimis risk? How should
agencies deal with the interests of future generations?
However these questions are resolved, there can be no doubt that the
cost-benefit default principles have emerged as a central part of what amounts to
the federal common law of regulatory policy. Of course most of that common
law, including the incipient federal common law of cost-benefit analysis, will
emerge, and is emerging, from regulatory agencies, which have to decide how
much to regulate, and why.14 Here agencies are the principal architects of what is
See Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 425 (4th ed 2000). I discuss the relevance of
the important decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, S. Ct. (Feb. 28, 2001),
below.
14 Hence, for example, different agencies have come up with different dollar figures by which to
value statistical lives; this is a central part of agency-made common law of cost-benefit analysis.
See the table in Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1105, 1146 (2000). There are also striking variations in
agency selection of discount rate, that is, the treatment of costs and benefits (such as lives saved)
13
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unmistakably a form of common law. But courts will undoubtedly play an
important role,15 and it is in the interaction between agencies and judges that
binding law will emerge. Among my largest purposes here is to understand the
nature of the cost-benefit default principles, their legitimacy, and their future
content.16
There is a still more general point in the background. The steady
emergence of the cost-benefit default principles signals the impending
conclusion, in all branches of government,17 of a “first generation” debate over
whether cost-benefit analysis is desirable.18 That debate appears to be
terminating with a general victory for its proponents, in the form of a
presumption in favor of their view (signaled above all, perhaps, by President
Clinton’s substantial endorsement of cost-benefit balancing via Executive
Order19). The “second generation” debates raise difficult questions about how
(not whether) to engage in cost-benefit analysis – how to value life and health,
how to deal with the interests of future generations, how to generate rules of
thumb to simplify complex inquiries, how to ensure that agencies do what they
are supposed to do, how and when to diverge from the conclusion
recommended by cost-benefit analysis, how to determine the roles of agencies
and courts in contested cases. My identification and assessment of the costbenefit default principles is intended as a contribution to these “second
generation” debates. An especially important “second generation” question is

in the future. See Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333, 1364-69 (1998) (documenting variations ranging from 2% to 10%).
These issues are treated below.
15 See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down agency
regulation of asbestos under statute calling for cost-benefit balancing).
16 It is important to see that many federal agencies do not comply with the apparent requirements
of cost-benefit balancing in existing executive orders. Robert Hahn has shown that compliance is
episodic and that a great deal needs to be done to systematize the process. See Robert W. Hahn et
al., Empirical Analysis: Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Failure of Agencies To
Comply With Executive Order 12866, 23 Harv J. L & PP 859 (2000). Here as elsewhere, there is a
large difference between law on the books and law in the world. I do not attempt here to address
the important issue of how to ensure compliance with principles that call for attention to costs
and benefits. But judicial review of agency action can serve as a partial corrective at least,
ensuring that in the egregious cases, agency action will be held invalid for failure to comply with
the principles. This point is discussed at several places below.
17 Within Congress, see eg, 5 USC 1532, 1535; within the executive, see note supra.
18 For discussion, see Symposium, 29 J. Legal Stud. 837 (2000); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs
of Mythic Proportions, 106 Yale LJ 1981 (1998).
19 See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993).
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when, if ever, the presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing is rebutted. I
attempt to make a start in answering that complex question.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II traces the rise of cost-benefit
default rules in federal law; it begins with the emergence of cost-benefit
principles, outlines statutory formulations, and then elaborates the default rules.
Part III explores the underlying considerations in some detail – what supports
the use of default principles generally and these default principles in particular.
In Part III, I address the general question when the presumption in favor of the
principles might be rebutted. Part IV turns to the question whether agencies
should be required to do what the cost-benefit default principles permit them to
do. Part V deals briefly with a set of issues that an agency must address if it is
going to engage in cost-benefit balancing. Part VI is a brief conclusion.

II.

Considering and Not Considering Costs

A. From 1970s Environmentalism to the Cost-Benefit State? A Prefatory Note
I will not attempt to resolve the broad question whether cost-benefit analysis
is a good idea, or whether the many recent initiatives in that direction should be
approved or modified.20 But as background to an understanding of the costbenefit default principles, a brief discussion is in order.
The rise of interest in cost-benefit balancing signals a dramatic shift from the
initial stages of national risk regulation. Those stages were undergirded by
might be called “1970s environmentalism,” which placed a high premium on
immediate responses to long-neglected problems, which emphasized the
existence of problems rather than their magnitude, and which was often rooted
in moral indignation directed at the behavior of those who created pollution and
other risks to safety and health.21 Defining aspects of 1970s environmentalism can
be found in the apparently cost-blind national ambient air quality provisions of
the Clean Air Act22 and in statutory provisions requiring “the best available
technology” without an assessment of either costs or benefits.23

For a range of perspectives, see Symposium, 29 J. Legal Stud. 837 (2000).
See Bruce Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 13 Colum. J. Env.
L. 171 (1988).
22 42 USC 7409(b).
23 See, eg, 33 USC 1311(b)(1)AA), 42 USC 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2), 7475(a)(4), 7502(c)(1).
20
21
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No one should deny that 1970s environmentalism has done an enormous
amount of good, helping to produce dramatic improvements in many domains,
above all in the context of air pollution, where ambient air quality has improved
for all major pollutants.24 Indeed, 1970s environmentalism appears, by most
accounts, to survive cost-benefit balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the
trillions of dollars, well in excess of the aggregate costs.25 EPA’s own estimates
suggest that as a result of the Clean Air Act, there were no less than 184,000
fewer premature deaths among people thirty years of age or older in 1990 – and
also that there were 39,000 fewer cases of congestive heart failure, 89,000 fewer
cases of hospital admissions for respiratory problems, 674,000 fewer cases of
chronic bronchitis, and 850,000 fewer asthma attacks.26 EPA finds annual costs of
air pollution control at $32 billion, hardly a trivial number, but less than 4% of
the annual benefits of $1.1 trillion.27 Even if the EPA’s own numbers show an
implausibly high ratio, significant adjustments still reveal benefits far higher
than costs.28
More generally, OMB has, for the last several years, engaged in a full
accounting of the costs and benefits of regulation.29 In general, the report shows
benefits in excess of cost. While the government’s own numbers should be
discounted – agency accounts may well be self-serving – at least they provide a
good place to start.30 In its 2000 report, OMB finds total regulatory benefits
ranging from $254 billion to $1.8 trillion, with total costs ranging from $146
billion to $229 billion, for net benefits ranging from $25 billion to $1.65 trillion.31
A more disaggregated picture is also encouraging. In the transportation sector,
the benefits range from $84 billion to $110 billion, with the costs from $15 billion
to $18 billion, for net benefits of $66 billion to $95 billion.32 In the net benefits
range from $9 billion to $12 billion. Much of the uncertainty stems from
uncertainty about environmental benefits and costs, producing a range from $-73

See Economic Analyses at EPA 455-56 (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1998); Paul Portnoy, Air
Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 77, 101-105 (Paul Portnoy and
Robert Stavins eds 2000).
25 Id.
26 Portnoy, supra, at 102-03.
27 Id. at 109.
28 Id. at 113 (showing a benefit-cost ratio of 3 to 1).
29 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/index.html.
30 For a good but sometimes dated overview, see Robert Hahn, What Do The Government’s Own
Numbers Tell Us?, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved (Robert Hahn ed 1995).
31 Id.; see 2000 report, charts, table 4.
32 Id.
24
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billion in net benefits to over $1.5 trillion in net benefits.33 For most government
action, however, the benefits seem to exceed the costs.34 As especially good
examples, consider the following regulations, all from recent years:
Table 1: Good Cost-Benefit Ratios
Regulation

Head impact
protection
Conservation
reserve program
Restriction on
sale and
distribution of
tobacco
Acid rain
controls
Energy
conservation
standards for
refrigerators
New surface
water treatment
Emission
standards for
new highway
heavy-duty
engines
Disposal of PCBs
Particulates
standard

2000 (net benefits
2005
in millions of
dollars)
310-370
1,210-1,510

2010

2015

1,210-1,510

1,210-1,510

$1100

$1100

$1100

$1100

9,020-9820

9,020-9820

9,020-10,220

9,020-9820

260-1900

260-1900

260-1900

260-1900

330

330-360

510-580

440-500

50-1,200

50-1,200

50-1,200

50-1,200

0

110-1200

110-1200

110-1200

136-736
0

136-736
0

136-736
12,000113,000

136-736
-20,00086,000

But even though the overall picture is no cause for alarm, a closer look at
federal regulatory policy shows a wide range of problems. Perhaps foremost is
33
34

See id.
See id., table 5.
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exceptionally poor priority-setting, with substantial resources sometimes going
to small problems, and with little attention to some serious problems.35 There are
also unnecessarily high costs, with no less than $400 billion being attributable to
compliance costs each year,36 including $130 billion on environmental protection
alone.37 OMB’s own report shows some disturbing numbers: For the next fifteen
years, OSHA’s methylene chloride regulation will have annual costs of $100
million and annual benefits of $40 million38; a regulation calling for roadway
worker protection has benefits of $30 million, but equivalent costs; the costbenefit ratio for airbag depowering regulation seems bad, though there is
uncertainty in the data39; EPA’s regulation for financial assurance for municipal
solid waste landfills has monetized benefits of $0, but costs of $100 million, and
this is expected for the next fifteen years.40 By way of general illustration,
consider the following table,41 all drawn from recent regulations:

Table 2: Questionable Cost-Benefit Ratios
Regulation

Exposure to
methylene
chloride
Roadway
worker
protection
Financial
assurance for
municipal
solid waste
landfills

2000 (net
benefits in
millions of
dollars)
-60

2005

2010

2015

-60

-60

-60

0

0

0

0

-100

-100

-100

-100

This is the theme of Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1995).
Thomas Hopkins, The Costs of Federal Regulation, 2 J Reg and Soc. Costs 5, 25 tbl. 2 (1992).
37 Paul Portney and Robert Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy, 8 J Risk and
Uncertainty 111, 119 n. 1 (1995).
38 Id., table 12.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
35
36
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Pulp and
paper effluent
guidelines
Ozone
standards
Child restraint
system
Vessel
response
plans
Nitrogen
oxide
emission from
new fossil fuel
fired steam
generating
units
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-150 to 0

-150 to 0

-150 to 0

-240 to 0

0

-235 to 240

-840 to 1190

-9,200 to -1000

-40 to 40

-40 to 40

-40 to 40

-40 to 40

-220

-220

-220

-220

-57 to 29

-57 to 29

-57 to 29

-57 to 29

These figures, drawn from regulations in a single year, show a less than
coherent pattern of regulation, especially when Table 1 is put together with Table
2. According to one study, better allocations of health expenditures could save,
each year, 60,000 additional lives at no additional cost – and such allocations
could maintain the current level of lives saved with $31 billion in annual
savings.42 The point has been dramatized by repeated demonstrations that some
regulations create significant substitute risks43 -- and that with cheaper, more
effective tools, regulation could achieve its basic goals while saving billions of
dollars.44
In these circumstances, the most attractive parts of the movement for costbenefit analysis have been rooted not in especially controversial judgments about
what government ought to be doing, but instead in a more mundane search for
pragmatic instruments designed to reduce the three central problems of poor
priority-setting, excessively costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate sideeffects of regulation. By drawing attention to costs and benefits, it should be
Tammy Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15
Risk Analysis 369 (1995).
43 See John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995).
44 See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets in Clean Air (2000); Robert Stavins, Market-Based
Environmental Policies, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, supra, at 31, 35-55.
42
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possible to spur the most obviously desirable regulations, to deter the most
obviously undesirable ones, to encourage a broader view of consequences, and to
promote a search for least-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals.45 Notice
here that so defended, cost-benefit analysis is not only an obstacle to unjustified
regulation; it should be a spur to government as well, showing that it should
attend to neglected problems. If cost-benefit balancing is supported on these
highly pragmatic grounds, the central question is whether that form of balancing
is actually producing what can be taken as policy improvements by people with
diverse views about appropriate policy.
On these counts, the record of cost-benefit analysis, at least within the EPA, is
generally encouraging.46 Assessments of costs and benefits has, for example,
helped produce more stringent and rapid regulation of lead in gasoline;
promoted more stringent regulation of lead in drinking water; led to stronger
controls on air pollution at the Grand Canyon and the Navaho Generating
Station; and produced a reformulated gasoline rule that promotes stronger
controls on air pollutants.47 In these areas, cost-benefit analysis, far from being
only a check on regulation, has indeed spurred governmental attention to
serious problems.
Cost-benefit analysis has also led to regulations that accomplish statutory
goals at lower cost, or that do not devote limited private and public resources to
areas where they are unlikely to do much good. With respect to asbestos, for
example, an analysis of benefits and costs led the EPA to tie the phase-down
schedules to the costs of substitutes, and also to exempt certain products from a
flat ban.48 With respect to lead in gasoline and control of CFCs (destructive of the
ozone layer), cost-benefit analysis helped promote the use of economic incentives
rather than command-and-control regulation49; economic incentives are much
cheaper and make more stringent regulation possible in the first place. For
regulation of sludge, protection of farmworkers, water pollution regulation for
the Great Lakes, and controls on organic chemicals, cost-benefit analysis helped
regulators produce modifications that significantly reduced costs.50 For modern
government, one of the most serious problems appears to be, not agency use of

For many examples, see Economic Analysis at EPA (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1996).
See id.
47 See id. at 458.
48 Id. at 458.
49 Id. at 49-86; 131-169.
50 Id. at 458.
45
46
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cost-benefit analysis, but frequent noncompliance with executive branch
requirements that agencies engage in such analysis.51
Of course cost-benefit analysis is hardly uncontroversial.52 Insofar as both
costs and benefits are being measured by the economic criterion of “private
willingness to pay,” there are many issues. Poor people often have little ability
and hence little willingness to pay; some people will be inadequately informed,
and hence show unwillingness to pay for benefits that would make their lives go
better53; and perhaps regulatory agencies should seek, not private willingness to
pay, but public judgments, as expressed in public arenas.54 Society is not best
taken as some maximizing machine, in which aggregate output is all that
matters. Sometimes a regulation producing $5 million in benefits but $6 million
in costs will be worthwhile, if those who bear the costs (perhaps representing
dollar losses alone?) can do so easily, and if those who receive the benefits
(perhaps representing lives and illnesses averted?) are especially needy.
In view of these problems, the strongest arguments for cost-benefit balancing
are based, not only on neoclassical economics, but also on an understanding of
human cognition, on democratic considerations, and on an assessment of the
real-world record of such balancing.55 Begin with cognition: People have a hard
time in understanding the systemic consequences of one-shot interventions.56
Unless they are asked to seek a full accounting, they are likely to focus on small
parts of problems, producing inadequate or even counterproductive solutions.57
Cost-benefit analysis is a way of producing that full accounting. Ordinary people
also have difficulty in calculating probabilities, and they tend to rely on rules of
thumb, or heuristics, that can lead them to make systematic errors.58 Cost-benefit
analysis is a natural corrective here. Because of intense emotional reactions to
See Hahn, supra note.
For a general challenge to quantification, see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 106 Yale LJ 1981 (1998).
53 See Adler and Posner, supra note.
54 Many of these points are pressed in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993).
55 I attempt to develop this point in Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
Legal Stud. 1059 (2000). In the same vein, see Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values At Risk
94-112 (Douglas MacLean ed 1986).
56 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1994).
57 Id.
58 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heurisics and Biases, in
Judgment unde Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and
Amos Tversky eds 1982); Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
psychology for Risk regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990).
51
52
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particular incidents, people often make mistakes in thinking about the
seriousness of certain risks.59 Cost-benefit balancing should help government
resist demands for regulation that are rooted in misperceptions of facts.
With respect to democracy, the case for cost-benefit analysis is strengthened
by the fact that interest-groups are often able to use these cognitive problems
strategically, thus fending off regulation that is desirable, or pressing for
regulation when the argument on its behalf is fragile.60 Here cost-benefit analysis,
taken as an input into decisions, can protect democratic processes by exposing an
account of consequences to public view. With respect to pragmatic
considerations, a review of the record suggests that cost-benefit balancing leads
to improvements, not on any controversial view of how to value the goods at
stake, but simply because such balancing leads to more stringent regulation of
serious problems, less costly ways of achieving regulatory goals, and a reduction
in expenditures for problems that are, by any account, relatively minor.61
None of these points suggests that cost-benefit analysis is a panacea for the
problems that I have identified. Everything depends on questions of
implementation, and there are also hard questions about appropriate valuation,
questions to which I shall return. Sometimes respect for rights, or concerns about
irreversibility, justify a rejection of cost-benefit balancing.62 The central point is
that cost-benefit analysis can be seen, not as opposition to some abstraction
called “regulation,” and not as an endorsement of the economic approach to
valuation, but as a real-world instrument, designed to ensure that the
consequences of regulation are placed before relevant officials and the public as a
whole, and intended to spur attention to neglected problems while at the same
time ensuring that limited resources will be devoted to areas where they will do
the most good. So understood, cost-benefit analysis promises to attract support
from a wide range of people with diverse perspectives on contested issues – a
promise realized in the apparently growing bipartisan consensus on some form
of cost-benefit balancing in many domains of regulatory policy.63 An
understanding of this consensus is an indispensable background for approaching
the cost-benefit default principles.

See George Loewenstein et al., Risk As Feelings (forthcoming 2001).
See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L.
Rev. 683 (1999).
61 See Economic Analysis at EPA 455-76.
62 TVA v. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978).
63 See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993).
59
60
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B. Statutory Terms
My emphasis here will be on the relationship between these points and judgemade default rules for statutory interpretation. But judge-made rules have
considerable overlap with approaches taken explicitly by Congress, in statutes
governing health, safety, and the environment. In fact there is undoubtedly an
interaction effect between statutes and judge-made law, with default principles
emerging from statutory formulations and vice-versa. Part of the argument for
the cost-benefit default principles is that they do not reflect purely judicial
polcymakng; those principles fit well with explicit enactments in other areas of
the law. In dealing with the role of benefits and costs, federal statutes tend to fall
in the following categories. I order the statutes roughly in accordance with their
treatment of cost-benefit balancing, beginning with those that most flatly reject it,
and ending with those that unambiguously embrace it.
1. Flat bans on consideration of costs. Some statutes, exemplifying 1970s
environmentalism, appear to forbid any consideration of cost. Perhaps
the most famous example is the Delaney Clause, which for a long period
prohibited food additives that “induce cancer in man or animal.”64 In the
face of that language, the government sought to permit additives that,
while carcinogenic, created only the most miniscule risks of cancer –
lower risks, in fact than those that would come from eating one peanut
with the FDA-permitted level of aflatoxins every 250 days, and much
lower risks than come from spending about 17 hours every year in Denver
(with its high elevation and radiation levels) rather than the District of
Columbia.65 Nonetheless, the Delaney Clause was taken to forbid any
form of balancing. 66 But a far more important example comes from the
most fundamental provisions of the Clean Air Act, governing national
ambient air quality standards.67 For a long time, the national ambient air
quality standards set under that Act have been understood to be based on
“public health” alone.68 The EPA’s judgment is to be grounded only in
benefits; the cost of compliance is irrelevant.
21 USC 376(b)(5)(B).
Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987).
66 Id.
67 42 USC 7409(b).
68 Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980). See also Union Electric Company v. EPA,
427 US 246 (1976) (holding that EPA may not consider economic and technological feasibility
when approving or disapproving a state implementation plan). As noted, the issue is currently
before the Supreme Court. See note supra.
64
65
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2. Significant risk requirements. An alternative formulation is to require the
agency to address only “significant” or “unacceptable” risks. On this
view, risks that do not reach a certain level need not and perhaps may not
be addressed. This is the prevailing interpretation of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, under both the toxic substance provisions and the
more general provisions of the Act.69 A requirement of a “significant risk”
falls short of cost-benefit analysis in the sense that it is entirely benefitsbased; costs are irrelevant as such. Once benefits fall below a certain
threshold, regulation is not required and in fact is banned.70 Once benefits
rise above that threshold, regulation is permissible, even if the benefits
seem low in comparison to the costs.
3. Substitute risks and health-health tradeoffs. Some statutes require
agencies to consider whether a regulation controlling one risk would, in so
doing, create a substitute risk. If so, agencies are permitted to decline to
regulate, or to regulate to a different point. These are clear statutory
recognition of health-health tradeoffs, which arise when there are health
concerns on both sides of the equation, from both more and less
regulation.71 Many statutory “consideration” requirements72 have an
unambiguous feature of this sort, for example by requiring agencies
entrusted with reducing air pollution problems to take account as well of
“non-air quality health and environmental impacts.” The Toxic
Substances Control Act similarly requires the EPA to take account of
substitute risks.73
4. Feasibility requirements. Some statutes require agencies to regulate “to
the extent feasible” or “achievable.”74 These expressions are far from
transparent. But as generally understood, such statutes put the focus not
on benefits but solely on costs, and on costs in a particular way: They
forbid an agency from regulating to a point that is neither (a) technically
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 US 607 (1980); International Union, UAW v.
OSHA, 37 F.3d 605 (DC Cir 1994).
70 American Trucking Assn. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), appears to endorse this view for
regulation of air pollutants, on the theory that an interpretation that would allow the EPA to pick
any point it chooses would violate the nondelegation doctrine.
71 See John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995).
72 42 USC 7429 (a) (2) (OSHA); 42 USC 300g-1(b)(4)(B) (Safe Drinking Water Act).
73 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
74 See, eg, 29 USC 655(b)(5).
69
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feasible, because the relevant control technology does not exist, nor (b)
economically feasible, because the industry cannot bear the cost without
significant or massive business failures.75 The line between (a) and (b),
usually treated as crisp and simple, is hardly that; whether a requirement
is technically feasible will usually depend on the level of resources that are
devoted to it. In practice, (a) and (b) therefore overlap in practice, with (b)
serving as a separate category only on those occasions when even with
massive use of existing resources, the technology cannot be brought into
existence. Noteworthy here is the fact that while a significant risk
requirement is entirely benefits-based, a feasibility requirement looks
exclusively at the cost side of the equation. Such a requirement is a
“block” of excessively expensive regulation.
5. “Consideration” requirements. A large number of statutes ask agencies to
“take into consideration” various factors, including cost, in addition to the
principal factor to which the statute draws the agency’s attention (such as
clean air or water). The most common formulation, now standard, asks
the agency to produce the “maximum degree of reduction” that is
“achievable,” after “taking into consideration [1] the cost of achieving
such emission reduction, and [2] any [a] non-air quality health and
environmental impacts and [b] energy requirements.”76 The basic idea
here is that the agency is supposed to qualify the pursuit of the
“maximum” achievable reduction by asking (a) whether the cost is
excessive, (b) whether energy requirements would be adversely affected,
and (c) whether the “maximum” requirement might create health and
environmental harms by, for example, increasing water pollution though
reducing air pollution. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA is
similarly instructed to back away from the maximum feasible level if the
benefits of the stricter standard “would not justify the costs of complying
with the level.”77
6. Cost-benefit requirements. Several statutes ask agencies to balance costs
against benefits, mostly through a prohibition on “unreasonable risks,”
alongside a definition of “unreasonable” that refers to both costs and
benefits. The most prominent examples are the Toxic Substances Control

452 US 490, 508-09 (1976); ADL-CIO v, OSHA. 965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir 1992).
76 42 USC 7429 (a) (2) (OSHA); 42 USC 300g-1(b)(4)(B) (Safe Drinking Water Act).
77 42 USC 300g-1(b)(6).
75
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Act78 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.79 Here
the agency is required to calculate both costs and benefits and to compare
them against each other. If the costs exceed the benefits, regulation is
unacceptable. More recently, cost-benefit analysis is mandated by the Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments.80 While Congress has thus far resisted
efforts to impose a cost-benefit “supermandate” calling for a general
decision rule based on cost-benefit balancing,81 Congress has enacted
legislation requiring assessment, and public disclosure, of costs and
benefits of major regulations.82 OMB itself has been required to produce
annual accounting of costs and benefits.83

In the abstract, the distinctions among these kinds of provisions should be
clear enough. A statute that calls for consideration of substitute risks does not
require cost-benefit balancing, because it is more narrowly concerned to ensure
that risks (generally to health) do not increase on balance; under a statute calling
for health-health tradeoffs, it is irrelevant that costs as such exceed benefits. A
statute that requires that regulations be “feasible” is ordinarily taken to entail no
comparison between costs and benefits, but a cost-focused inquiry into what
industry is able to do -- whereas a statute that regulates “significant risks” is
ordinarily taken to entail no comparison between costs and benefits, but a
benefit-centered inquiry into the magnitude of the risk to be addressed.
Of course many open questions remain, and I will return to those
questions in Part IV. Let us simply take this menu of options as the background
for understanding the nature of the cost-benefit default rules.
C. The Default Rules Identified: An Overview
If Congress has been genuinely clear, the legal issue is at an end. But statutory
terms are frequently ambiguous (this is an initial difficulty), and sometimes an
interpretive problem is created by general language that seems not to reflect
15 USC 2605 (a).
7 USC 136a(a).
80 42 USC 300g-1(b)(3).
81 See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L.
Rev. 247 (1996).
82 5 USC 1532, 1535
83 See, eg, section 625 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, PL 10561; section 638(a) of the 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act.
78
79
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anything like congressional consideration of the specific point at issue (this is a
second difficulty). In the face of statutory uncertainty, cases provide support for
each of the following principles. For some of the principles, the law is more
developed than for others; but each of the principles is an identifiable part of
contemporary public law.
-- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to
make de minimis exceptions to statutory requirements, by exempting small
risks from regulatory controls.84
-- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to
take costs into account in issuing regulations. In its current form, this
principle means that where statutes are ambiguous, agencies will have the
authority to consider costs as well as benefits.85
-- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to
balance the health risks created by regulation against the health benefits
created by regulation.86
-- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to
decline to regulate past the point where regulation would be economically or
technologically feasible.87
-- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be expected to
balance costs against benefits in issuing regulations.88
Now let us explore some details.
D. De Minimis Exceptions
1. The basic idea. In a series of cases, the D.C. Circuit has developed a
principle authorizing agencies to make de minimis exceptions to regulatory
requirements. The initial case was Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy.89 There the agency
banned acrylonitrile on the ground that it counts as a “food additive,” migrating
in small amounts from bottle into drinks within bottles. The FDA concluded that
the ban was justified on safety grounds, a conclusion that the court found
inadequately justified. But what is more important in the case is the general
language with which the court remanded the case to the FDA. The court stressed
See, e.g. Committee on Sensible Transportation, Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60 (DC Cir 1987).
213 F. 2d 663 at XX.
86 This principle appears to underlie American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (1999).
87 See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (DC Cir. 1987).
88 956 F.2d 321 (DC Cir 1992).
89 613 F.2d 947 (DC Cir 1979).
84
85
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that the agency had discretion to exclude a chemical from the statutory definition
of food additives if “the level of migration into food . . . is so negligible as to
present no public health or safety concerns.”90
A related case presented the question whether the EPA was permitted to
make categorical exemptions under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
program of the Clean Air Act.91 Here the court spoke in more ambitious terms,
showing considerable enthusiasm for de minimis exemptions. It announced that
“[c]ategorical exemptions may be permissible as an exercise of agency power,
inherent in most statutory schemes, to overlook circumstances that in context
may fairly be considered de minimis. It is commonplace, of course, that the law
does not concern itself with trifling matters, and this principle has often found
application in the administrative context. Courts should be reluctant to apply the
literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless expenditures.”92 In fact the court
expressly connected this principle with the idea that the court should “look
beyond the words to the purpose of the act” to avoid “absurd or futile results.”93
Thus the court concluded, in its broadest statement on the point, that “most
regulatory statutes, including the Clean Air Act, permit” de minimis exemptions
upon an adequate factual showing.94
Here, then, is an explicit recognition of agency authority to exempt de
minimis risks from regulatory controls. The authority operates as a clear
statement principle, no less but also no more: Where Congress has
unambiguously banned such exceptions, agencies are bound, and may not create
de minimis exemptions even in compelling circumstances.95
In the same vein, consider Sierra Club v. Department of Transportation.96
At issue there was a statutory requirement that the Secretary of Transportation
refuse to approve the “use” of significant public park land unless “the program
or project includes all possible planning to minimize the harm to the park . . .
resulting from the use.”97 The statutory question was whether limited
commercial jet landings in an airport in the Grand Teton National Park should
Id. at 955.
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (DC Cir 1979).
92 Id at 359.
93 Id. at 360 n.89.
94 Id. at 360.
95 Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987).
96 763 F.2d 120 (DC Cir 1985).
97 49 USC 303©.
90
91
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qualify as a “use,” in the face of a reasonable agency finding that the increase in
flights would not result in a “significant” change in noise. The court found that
the term “use” should be understood to authorize de minimis exceptions.98 There
are many decisions in the same vein.99
2. The OSHA variation: requiring de minimis exceptions. A noteworthy
variation on the basic idea of permitting de minimis exceptions can be found in
the plurality opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API, known as
the Benzene Case.100 What the plurality said represents a variation on the basic
idea for two reasons. First, the plurality forbids the agency to regulate trivial
risks; it goes well beyond permitting the agency to create exemptions. Second,
the plurality’s substantive standard is phrased not in terms of de minimis
exceptions to regulation, but of limiting regulation to “significant” risks, and
hence prohibiting regulation of risks not shown to be “significant.” The second
difference might or might not be important, because it is not clear whether risks
that do not qualify as “significant” should be treated as de minimis, though this
does appear to be what the plurality had in mind.
The central issue in the case was whether OSHA had to show a
“significant risk” in order to regulate a toxic substance (benzene in the case
itself). In arguing that it did not, the government pointed to the central
provision, which said (and says) that in promulgating the relevant standards, the
Secretary “shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity, even if such employee has
regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his
working life.”101 The statute’s general definition of occupational safety and health
standards said (and says) that these are standards “reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful places of employment.”102

Id. at 130; the case is expressly understood in this way in Coalition on Safe Transportation v.
Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 63 (DC Cir 1987).
99 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 337, 343-45 (DC Cir 1993); EDF v. EPA, 82 F3d 451 (DC
Cir 1996)’ Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1556-57 (DC Cir 1989); Ohio v. EPA 997 F.2d 1520,
1535 (DC Cir 1993) (suggesting that “the literal meaning of a statute need not be followed where
the precise terms lead to absurd or futile results, or where failure to allow a de minimis
exemption is contrary to the primary legislative goal”).
100 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
101 29 USC 655(b)(5).
102 29 USC 652(8).
98
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A straightforward interpretation of the statutory terms, urged by four
justices on the Supreme Court, would seem to suggest that no significant risk
need be shown.103 The key statutory language is the “no employee will suffer”
phrase, which indicates that even if a toxic substance places only one or a few
workers in jeopardy, OSHA must act to provide protection. Whatever the
meaning of the obscure general definitional clause (“reasonably necessary or
appropriate”), the more specific provision, dealing with toxic substances, would
appear to trump any contrary indications in the more general one. Nonetheless, a
plurality of the Court rejected OSHA’s argument to this effect and hence rejected
OSHA’s interpretation of the statute.
In holding that a “significant risk” must be shown, the plurality
contended that a contrary interpretation would defy common sense: “In light of
the fact that there are literally thousands of substances used in the workplace
that have been identified as carcinogens or suspected carcinogens, the
Government’s theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that
might produce little, if any, discernible benefits.”104 Though the plurality left
undecided the question whether the agency must also show a reasonable
proportion between costs and benefits, it is clear, from the passage just quoted,
that the “significant risk” requirement was motivated partly by the desire to
ensure some kind of proportionality between benefits and costs, on the theory
that the requirement serves to protect against the most egregious
disproportions.105
In American Textile Manufacturers’ Institute v. Donovan,106 however, the
Court emphasized what it saw as the ordinary meaning of the word ”feasible” in
order to hold that OSHA was not required to engage in cost-benefit balancing. In
the Court’s view, the agency’s job is to ensure that all regulated risks are
“significant.” Once a significant risk is shown, the agency is required to regulate
to the point where compliance would no longer be “feasible,” in the sense of
practicable.107 The fact that a regulation violated a cost-benefit test is neither here
nor there. This holding raises many questions, to which I will return.108 For the
moment the key point is that the Court’s interpretation of OSHA builds on the

448 US at XX (Marshall, J., dissenting).
448 US at 617.
105 Id.
106 452 US 490 (1981).
107 Id. at 496.
108 See below.
103
104
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idea that de minimis exceptions are permitted to reach a conclusion that
insignificant risks may not be regulated at all.
E. Consideration of Cost
The presumption that agencies may “consider costs” has also emerged in
a series of important cases within the D.C. Circuit. Consider three examples,
At issue in Grand Canyon Air Coalition v. FAA,109 was an FAA regulation
designed to reduce noise from airplanes over the Grand Canyon. The statute
required “substantial restoration” of the “natural quiet,” which the FAA
understood to require that the Park achieve 50% of the natural quiet at least 75%
of the day. In refusing to impose stricter controls, the FAA explained that it took
into “consideration of the needs of the air tour industry.”110 From its ambiguous
explanation, it appears that the FAA sought partly to protect the air tour industry
as such, but mostly to protect tourists in their ability to see the Grand Canyon
from the air. Not surprisingly, the FAA had been asked to impose both more
strict and less strict regulation, and its decision was contested, by different
parties, as both too strict and as excessively lenient.
Those challenging the rule said that the FAA’s task was to ensure
“substantial restoration” of the “natural quiet,” and that protection of the air tour
industry was a statutorily irrelevant factor.111 The court responded by invoking
something like a presumption in favor of considering cost, noting that nothing in
the statute “forbids the government from considering the impact of its regulation
on the air tour industry.”112 The court’s passage is ambiguous, but it appears to
be a recognition that in the face of congressional silence, at least one kind of cost
– that involving the air tour industry -- will be within agency discretion to
consider. The narrowest construction of the court’s opinion is that statutes
should not be taken to be self-defeating, so that the FAA is permitted to conclude
that a statute designed to enable people to enjoy the Grand Canyon, by reducing
noise, should not be implemented with regulation so strict as to disable people
from enjoying the Grand Canyon by the air.113 A broader reading is that under
154 F.3d 45 (1998).
Id. at 48.
111 Id. at 49.
112 Id.
113 Careful readers will notice that whether this conclusion is necessary to prevent the statute
from being self-defeating depends on how the statute’s purposes are characterized: If the purpose
is to reduce noise for those visiting the Grand Canyon, an interpretation that would ignore the
109
110
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ambiguous statutes, agencies will be presumed able to take into account the costs
of various implementation strategies.114
Support for the broader reading comes from George Warren Corp. v.
EPA, where domestic companies challenged the EPA’s implementation of the
reformulated gasoline provisions of the Clean Air Act. A central question for the
EPA was how to treat foreign refiners and importers. In resolving that question,
the EPA considered not only air quality benefits, but also the comments of the
Department of Energy (DOE). That agency expressed concern that certain
approaches could increase the price and decrease the quantity of gasoline, by
making it more difficult for foreign refiners to divert production to the United
States in periods of increased demand.116 The EPA took this point expressly into
account in its rule. The result was an outcome more favorable to foreign refiners,
and less favorable to environmental protection or domestic competitors, than
EPA might otherwise have chosen. Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency’s
decision, emphasizing the absence of an explicit legislative ban on consideration
of these economic factors.117 The court appeared to suggest that an express
congressional preclusion of economic factors would be necessary in order to
make them irrelevant as a matter of law.
115

By far the most explicit statement on point, however, comes from State of
Michigan v. EPA.118 At issue there was an EPA decision to approve a state
implementation plan (SIP) for the regulation of ozone. The statutory term
provided that SIPs must contain provisions adequately prohibiting “any source
or other type of emissions activity within the state from emitting any air
pollutants in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in,
or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard.”119 At first glance,
this provision might well be read as a kind of absolute ban on “significantly
contributing” pollutants. But the EPA did not understand it that way. Instead the
EPA reached a more subtle conclusion: The “significant contributors” would be
required to reduce their ozone, but only by the amount achievable via “highly
interests of the air tour industry would not be self-defeating at all. Unfortunately there is no
simple purpose to be “found” behind this statute.
114 This is how the case is read in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.2d 663, (2000).
115 159 F.2d 616 (1998).
116 Id. at 619.
117 Id. at 619-20.
118 213 F.3d 663 (2000).
119 42 USC 7410(a)(2)(D)9I)(I).
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cost-effective controls,”120 meaning those that could produce large reductions
relatively cheaply. In states with high control costs, then, relatively low
reductions would be required.
Apparently because of the clarity of the statutory language on the
particular point, no one in the case argued that EPA was required to balance
costs against benefits before issuing regulations. Challenging the EPA’s
interpretation, environmental groups urged that the statute banned any
consideration of costs at all. The court rejected the argument, finding no “clear
congressional intent to preclude consideration of costs.”121 But the court
obviously had a difficult time with the statutory terms “contribute significantly,”
which seem to refer to environmental damage, not to environmental damage
measured in light of cost. In upholding the EPA’s decision, the court insisted that
significance should not “be measured in only one dimension,” that of “health
alone.” In fact in some settings, the term “begs a consideration of costs.”122 In the
court’s view, EPA would be unable to determine “’significance’ if it may consider
only health,” especially in light of the fact that ozone causes adverse health
effects at any level. If adverse effects exist on all levels, how can EPA possibly
choose a standard without giving some weight to cost?123
But there is a serious problem for this conclusion. Taken together, the
OSHA cases seem to argue in the opposite direction. As we have seen, the
requirement that OSHA show a “significant” risk (a requirement imposed in the
Benzene Case) has not been taken to mean that OSHA must or even may
consider costs (with cost-benefit balancing apparently banned by the Cotton
Dust Case). To this the court responded that in the aftermath of those cases,
OSHA has itself attempted to ensure, and invariably claimed, that the costs of
safety standards are “reasonably related to their benefits.”124 In any case “the
most formidable obstacle” to a ban on consideration of cost “is the settled law of
this circuit,”125 which requires an explicit legislative statement to preclude
consideration of cost. Here, then, is an express judicial endorsement of a costbenefit default principle, permitting agencies to consider costs if they seek to do
so.

213 F.3d at 675.
Id. at 678.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 677.
125 213 F. 3d at 678.
120
121
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F. Substitute Risks

Extensive attention has recently been given to the problem of “risk-risk”
or “health-health” tradeoffs, which arise when regulation of one health problem
gives rise to another health problem.126 Suppose that more stringent fuel
economy standards for new cars, justified partly on environmental and thus
health-related grounds, would have the effect of leading automobile
manufacturers to produce smaller and more dangerous cars, thus resulting in a
significant loss of life in accidents.127 Is the agency entitled to take this effect into
account? Or suppose that the FDA is asked to require genetically engineered
foods to be labeled as such; if the labels would lead consumers to switch to less
safe substitutes, such as organic foods,128 may the FDA take that effect into
account? Or return to the case with which I began and suppose that the Federal
Aviation Administration is asked to require children under the age of three to
have their own seats in airplanes. The regulation might be urged on the ground
that it would prevent a number of injuries in the air and also produce protection
in the event of a crash. In the abstract, it is reasonable to think that children will
be helped as a result. But suppose that a consequence of the mandatory purchase
of a seat would be to lead many parents to drive rather than fly, on the ground
that flying has suddenly become significantly more expensive. It is possible that
the overall consequence of the proposed FAA rule would be that more children
will die. Is the FAA permitted to take this effect into account?
Recent cases suggest an emerging principle of interpretation, in the form
of a strong presumption in favor of permitting (and even requiring) agencies to
take account of substitute risks, and hence to undertake health-health tradeoffs.
In American Trucking Association, for example, it was argued that while
ground-level ozone creates certain health risks, it also produces certain health
benefits, above all because it provides protection against skin cancer and
cataracts.129 The EPA responded that it lacked authority to consider the risks
created by regulation or (to put the point slightly differently) the health benefits
of an air pollutant.130
Taken on its own, the statutory text seemed to support the EPA’s view, or
at least to make that view a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous terms. The
See, e.g., Symposium, 8 J. Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1994).
See note supra.
128 See Alan McHughen, Pandora’s Picnic Basket 201-29, 232-237 (2000).
129 175 F.3d at 1051.
130 Id. at 1051-52.
126
127
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statute provides that ambient standards must be based on “criteria” documents,
which are supposed to include “the latest scientific knowledge useful in
indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or
welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the
ambient air, in varying quantities.”131 EPA urged, plausibly, that the phrase
“identifiable effects” of “such pollutant” was meant to refer to the adverse effects
of the “pollutant,” not to its beneficial effects. But the court concluded that the
statute could not be interpreted in that way.132 In a passage that suggests a
strong presumption in favor of health-health tradeoffs, the court said
(unconvincingly) that the statute was unambiguous, and (far more convincingly)
that “EPA’s interpretation fails even the reasonableness standard . . .; it seems
bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health would . . . lock the
agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s health effects in determining
the maximum level for that substance.”133 What is most striking about this
suggestion is that the court seems to have gone beyond the view that the agency
is permitted to engage in health-health tradeoffs if it chooses, and to require the
EPA to do so even if it would chose otherwise.
Or consider Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA,134 where the
plaintiffs challenged fuel economy standards precisely on the ground that the
agency had failed to take account of the adverse effects of such standards on
automobile safety. In the face of an ambiguous statute, the court insisted that a
full explanation was required for a decision that, in the abstract, would seem to
create serious substitute risks.135 As a result of this decision, it is now the law
that NHTSA must taken into account any evidence of adverse safety effects in
the process of setting fuel economy standards. On remand, NHTSA confronted
the evidence and concluded that the alleged effect could not be demonstrated – a
conclusion that the court upheld on appeal.136 What is important for present
purposes is the clear holding that the agency is permitted and even obliged to
consider health-health tradeoffs in setting fuel economy standards.

42 USC 7408(aq)(2).
175 F.3d at 1052.
133 175 F.3d at 1052.
134 956 F.2d 321 (DC Cir 1992).
135 Id. at 324.
136 45 F.3d 481, 484-86 (DC Cir 1995).
131
132
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G. Feasibility
Many statutes expressly require regulation to be “feasible.”137 But what if the
statute is silent or ambiguous on the question whether agencies may impose
regulations beyond the point of “feasibility”? Sometimes statutes are
“technology-forcing,” in the sense that they require companies to innovate, and
thus to do more than what current technology permits.138 Often, however, the
technology that is ‘forced” by statutory requirements is entirely feasible, indeed
that it part of the reason that Congress requires it. In fact technology-forcing can
be justified by cost-benefit principles themselves -- if the benefits of forcing
technology outweigh the costs, as they sometimes do. Companies might fail to
innovate with respect to pollution control simply because they do not internalize
all of the benefits of the innovation. But technological innovation is sometimes
neither feasible nor justified by cost-benefit principles. Because of large costs,
regulation will sometimes raise serious questions from the standpoint of
feasibility, in the sense that it will drive many companies out of business or
require technologies that are not now and cannot soon be made available. Here
the question is how to handle legislative silence.
The question arose most prominently in NRDC v. EPA,139 involving the toxic
substances provision of the Clean Air Act. That provision, since substantially
revised,140 required EPA to issue regulations that would provide “an ample
margin of safety to protect the public health.”141 The principal question was
whether cost was relevant to the EPA’s judgment. On its face, the statute might
seem to block any consideration of cost and indeed to require regulations that
would reduce risks to zero, especially because for many toxic substances, safe
thresholds simply do not exist. Alert to this point, the EPA urged that it should
be allowed to take feasibility into account in setting regulations. The court
accepted this conclusion by suggesting that regulations could avoid “zero risk”
in two ways. First, the EPA was required to make an initial, benefits-based, costblind determination of what is “safe”; but citing the Benzene case, the court said
that “safe” did not mean “risk-free.”142 Thus “the Administrator’s decision must
be based upon an expert judgment with regard to the level of emission that will
See supra.
For general discussion, see Bruce LaPierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental
Protection Statutes, 62 Iowa L Rev 771 (1977).
139 824 F.2d 1146 (DC Cir 1987).
140 See 42 USC 7412.
141 USC
142 824 F.2d at 1149.
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result in an ‘acceptable’ risk to health.”143 Of course there is a degree of
arbitrariness in any particular judgment here, especially if the judgment is costblind. But the court was apparently attempting to ensure a degree of visibility
and consistency in agency decisions, by ensuring that the “acceptable risk”
judgment would be made publicly, and would be adhered to in a range of cases.
Second, the court said that in deciding how far to go beyond “safety,” in
order to provide an “ample margin,” the Administrator was permitted to
consider both costs and feasibility.144 It is clear that the court engrafted these
ideas onto a statute that did not expressly include them. In this sense, the
decision suggests an interpretive principle to the effect that a statute that is silent
or ambiguous on the point will ordinarily be taken to permit the agency to take
account of the feasibility of statutory commands.
H. Costs and Benefits
If the statute is ambiguous or silent on the point, will an agency be permitted
to decide in accordance with cost-benefit balancing? Is an agency authorized to
make such balancing the basis for decision?
1. In general. An affirmative answer was given in NRDC v. EPA145 (the same
title, but not the same case, as that just discussed). At issue there was the EPA’s
decision whether to classify a source of fugitive emissions as “major” within the
meaning of a statutory provision calling for regulation of “major emitting
facilities.146 The EPA concluded that it would not add certain industrial sources,
including surface coal mines, on the ground that the social and economic costs of
regulation would outweigh the environmental benefits.147 The statutory language
did not require cost-benefit analysis and the court emphasized that an alternative
construction as not barred by statutory language and legislative history.148
Nonetheless, the court said that it would treat the agency’s interpretation as
permissible in the face of legislative silence.
Interpretation of OSHA has showed identical thinking. Outside of the area of
toxic substances, the statute (with its opaque “reasonably necessary or
Id.
Id. at 1150-51.
145 937 F.2d 641 (DC Cir 1991).
146 42 USC 7475.
147 937 F.2d at 643.
148 Id. at 645.
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appropriate” language) is ambiguous on whether cost-benefit analysis may be
made the basis for decision. Here a prominent court went out of its way to say
that OSHA is permitted to decide on the basis of cost-benefit balancing if it
wishes.149 In a challenge to the agency’s lockout/tagout rule, the court of appeals
said that such balancing would be a permissible basis for agency decisions, and
indeed seemed to suggest that this would be the court’s preferred route.150 On
remand, the agency appeared to decline the court’s invitation, choosing a test
based largely on a mixture of the “significant risk” and “feasibility”
requirements, a test that the court upheld.151 But the story does not end there. The
agency has continued to say – perhaps to insulate itself from a court challenge –
that it finds a “reasonable relationship” between costs and benefits, and in its
most recent pronouncement on the issue, the court treats this as an authoritative
constructive of the statute.152 It remains to see whether an OSHA regulation that
is said not to show such a reasonable relationship might be challenged as
unlawful.
2. The TSCA wrinkle. A more aggressive ruling, with a statutory text more
favorable to cost-benefit balancing, is Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.153 What
makes this a wrinkle is that as in the Benzene case, the court said not merely that
the agency is permitted to follow an interpretive principle, but that it is required
to do so. At the same time, the Corrosion Proof Fitting court’s decision is the
most elaborate statement to date of the emerging federal common law of costbenefit analysis.
At issue was the EPA’s attempted ban on asbestos, an admittedly
carcinogenic substance, under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).154 TSCA
allows EPA to regulate “unreasonable risks,”155 and it therefore invites some kind
of cost-benefit balancing. But the court went far beyond what the statute
unambiguously invited. In addition to allowing EPA to engage in cost-benefit
balancing, the court required a high degree of quantification from EPA,
including explicit comparisons of the cost-benefit ratios for different degrees of
International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991).
Id.
151 International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 605 (DC Cir 1994).
152 See Michigan v. EPA, supra note.
153 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
154 15 USC 2600 et seq.
155 The term appears no less than 35 times in 33 pages of the statute. See William Rodgers, The
Lesson of the Owls and the Crows, 4 J Land Use & Envtl. L. 377, 379 (1989). See, e.g., 15 SC
2605(a); 2605(c)(!).
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regulation, and also separate discussions of how regulation would affect
different industries using asbestos.156 The court thus insisted that the EPA go
beyond a comparison of “a world with no further regulation” and “a world in
which no manufacture of asbestos takes place” to include as well cost-benefit
comparisons under different approaches to regulation.157
At the same time, the court objected, not to the overall cost-benefit ratio, but
to the cost-benefit ratios for some areas in which asbestos was to be banned:
“[T]he agency’s analysis results in figures as high as $74 million per life saved.
For example, the EPA states that is ban of asbestos pipe will save three lives over
the next thirteen years, at a cost of $128-277 million (343-76 million per life saved)
. . .; that its ban of asbestos shingle will cost $23-34 million to save 0.32 statistical
lives ($72-106 million per life saved); that its ban of asbestos coatings will cost
$460181 million to save 2.22 lives ($14-54 million per life saved) . . .”158 With
evident incredulity, the court sad that the “EPA would have this court believe
that Congress . . . thought that spending $200-300 million to save approximately
seven lives (approximately $30-40 million per life) over thirteen years is
reasonable.”159 All in all, this is an exceptionally aggressive use of the interpretive
principle in favor of cost-benefit balancing. The court not only construes
statutory text in a way that mandates such balancing, but also requires a
demonstration that particular parts, and subparts, of the relevant regulation
satisfy a cost-benefit inquiry.160
I. A Note on American Trucking
In a sense, the cost-benefit default principles were tested before the Supreme
Court in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations.161 In that case, the Court
was asked to say that the EPA could consider costs in setting national ambient air
quality standards. The Court refused the invitation, concluding that such
standards must be set without regard to cost. The Court emphasized the evident

947 F.2d at 1205-07.
Id. at 1208.
158 Id. at 1209.
159 Id.
160 See also American Dental Association v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding OSHA
regulations designed to protect against hepatitis and AIDS, and noting that the “rule’s implicit
valuation of life is high – about $4 million – but not so astronomical certainly by regulatory
standards, as to call the rationality of the rule seriously into question, especially when we
consider that neither Hepatitis B nor AIDS is a disease of old people”).
161 113 S. Ct (2001).
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clarity of the statutory provision at issue, which defined national standards as
those “requisite to protect the public health.”162 In context, the reference to
“public health” seemed to require a cost-blind judgment, based on health alone.
Does American Trucking throw the cost-benefit default principles into doubt?
The simple answer is that it does not. The Court concluded that the Clean Air Act
was unambiguous; it did not by any means suggest that an ambiguous statute
would be taken to disallow consideration of costs. In his separate opinion, Justice
Breyer was careful to say that courts “should read silences or ambiguities in the
language of regulatory statutes” to permit consideration of “all of a proposed
regulation’s adverse effects,” at leas where those effects would clearly be serious
and disproportionate.”163 Justice Breyer was clearly concerned that the Court’s
approach would permit consideration of costs only where Congress had been
explicit on the point. But at first glance, Justice Breyer’s concern seems baseless.
The Court was saying only that in view of the clarity of the main provision of the
Clean Air Act, judges would be reluctant to find permission to consider costs
elsewhere, since Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions – it does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes.”164 This is a standard approach to statutory
interpretation. It does not suggest that where a statute’s “fundamental details”
are vague, they will be interpreted to forbid consideration of cost.
But it would be possible to read the Court's opinion a bit more broadly. The
Court seems to suggest that a statute should not be taken to confer broad
discretionary authority on agencies: “We find it implausible that Congress would
give to the EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether
implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards.”165 To
support the view that American Trucking is best taken to disallow agencies to
interpret ambiguous statutes to allow consideration of costs, it would be
necessary to make a simple, two-step argument. First: Statutes should be
construed so as to give agencies less rather than more in the way of discretion.
Second: A construction of a statute that would allow agencies to decide whether
to consider costs significantly increases agency discretion. Now the claim here is
not that a statute requiring cost-benefit analysis is itself disfavored on delegation
grounds. The claim is instead that an interpretation should be disfavored if the

42 USC 7409(b)(1).
113 S Ct at
164 Id. at
165 Id. at
162
163
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consequence of the interpretation would be to authorize the agency to decide
whether to engage in cost-benefit balancing. If this claim is accepted, then the
default rule in favor of allowing agencies to consider costs stands as repudiated.
This may be the concern that animates part of Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion. Justice Breyer urges that "In order better to achieve regulatory goals for example, to allocate resources so that they save more lives or produce a
cleaner environment - regulators must often take account of all of a proposed
regulation's adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious
and disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being
equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory
statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational regulation."166 Justice
Breyer is clearly saying that in the face of statutory ambiguity, agencies should
be allowed to consider costs, if only because that approach would increase the
likelihood of rational regulation.
But it is most unlikely that the Court would disagree with him. Agencies are
typically allowed to interpret statutory ambiguities,167 and in countless cases in
which that principle is invoked, the agency exercises a great deal of discretion
over basic issues of policy and principle.168 To allow an agency to decide to
consider costs is not to allow it to exercise more discretion than it does in
numerous cases. For reasons discussed below, I believe that agencies should
ordinarily be required, not merely permitted, to take costs into account, because
it is most reasonable to assume that this is what Congress sought.169 But where
the statute is unclear, agencies should be authorized to seek “rational
regulation”; and nothing in American Trucking suggests otherwise. This is
especially so in light of the fact, emphasized by both the Court170 and Justice
Breyer,171 that the Clean Air Act allows EPA to consider costs at numerous stages
in the implementation process.

Id. at
See Chevron v. NRDC, discussed infra.
168 See, e.g., id.; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 US 687 (1995); Young v. Community
Nutrition Institute, 476 US 974 (1986)
169 See below.
170 113 S Ct at
171 113 S. Ct. at
166
167
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III. Underlying Considerations

What are the foundations of the cost-benefit default principles? What is
their rationale? Though the various default principles should be evaluated
separately, there are common concerns in the background. We begin with
statutory interpretation in general.
A. Ambiguity, Absurdity, and Excessive Generality
1. Three kinds of default principles. There is nothing new or unusual about
default principles for statutory interpretation. They are ubiquitous. In fact they
are inevitable.172 Language has no meaning without default principles of many
kinds; everyone uses them every day. Generally such principles are agreed-upon,
so much so that they do not seem to be principles at all. They are part of what it
means to understand the relevant language. They need not even be identified,
much less defended. But sometimes the principles are contested, or at least
subject to contest, and in such cases, they must certainly be identified and
defended, and the fact that they are being used is obvious to all.
We might distinguish three circumstances here.
-- The simplest cases involves genuine ambiguity, in the sense that without
resort to an identifiable default principle, courts really do not know what the
statutory term means. Here the default principle will operate as a tie-breaker,
authorizing an agency to act when the case is otherwise in equipoise. The use
of default principles is uncontroversial in such cases; without some such
principles, cases cannot be decided.
-- Less simple cases involve texts that are most naturally or easily taken to
forbid the agency action, but when there is nonetheless ambiguity. Here the
default principles are serving as “clear statement” principles – suggesting that
the statute will be understood to allow the agency to do what it seeks unless
Congress expressly says otherwise. This is of course a more aggressive use of
default principles, pushing statutes away from the disfavored terrain. It
appears to be the law, for example, that agencies will be allowed to consider

For discussion from different perspectives, see William Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 415, 420-135 (1989).
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costs unless Congress expressly prohibits them from doing so;173 this is a clear
statement principle, used not only when courts are in equipoise.
-- The third and most complex cases involves the sort of interpretive problem
that might be understood to involve excessive generality. This is the kind of
problem found when, for example, a statute saying “no vehicles in the park”
is applied to a war memorial consisting of a tank used in World War II,174 or
when a nephew who has murdered his uncle seeks to inherit under a will that
has not been revoked.175 In many legal systems, courts will look behind the
language of the statute to prevent an outcome that makes no sense and that
could not possibly have been intended.176 This was the court’s suggestion
about the de minimis exception in Alabama Power, 177 and the court’s
requirement that EPA consider health-health tradeoffs was clearly
understood in similar terms, as an effort to prevent an outcome that would be
“bizarre” and hence that Congress could not have wanted.178

2. Sense vs. nonsense. These are the circumstances for using default
principles.179 But what is the appropriate content of such principles? This is a
large question, and it makes sense to begin with established understandings.
Where meaning is not clear, many time-honored principles are designed
to give sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt. An old interpretive
principle, with roots in almost all legal systems,180 counsels courts to avoid
“absurdity”; sometimes this principle has been taken into to override statutory
language. More particular principles, of considerable current importance,
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (DC Cir 2000).
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1965).
175 See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
176 See McCormick and Summers, Interpreting Statutes (199X).
177 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (DC Cir 1979).
178 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027, 1052 (DC Cir 1999).
179 I do not explore here the choice between “intentional-mimicking” and “intentional-eliciting”
default rules, a choice well elaborated in the law of contract. See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ 87 (1989).
In the area of statutory construction, it might be thought that courts should do what they think
Congress would have done, if it had made provision on the point (a suggestion that supports the
cost-benefit default rules) – and that if courts are unsure what Congress would have done, they
should choose a rule that will encourage Congress to be more clear in the future (a suggestion
that might argue against some of the default rules, on the ground that without them, Congress
will be led to be clearer in the future). For detailed discussion, see Einer Elhauge, [two
unpublished manuscripts 2000].
180 See McCormick and Summers, supra note.
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disfavor retroactivity181; require Congress to speak clearly if it seeks to create
exemptions from the antitrust law; give the benefit of the doubt to Native
Americans; and say that agencies will not, on their own, be taken to have the
authority to apply statutes outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States.182 It was probably inevitable that confronted with a wide range of
regulatory enactments, courts would eventually develop a set of analogues for
the regulatory state – principles that give rationality and sense the benefit of the
doubt in the particular context of contemporary regulatory law.183
Each of the cost-benefit default principles is best defended on just this
ground -- that they do give sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt and that
Congress should not be taken to have mandated irrationality or absurdity. On
this count, some of the default principles should be less controversial than others.
At the very least, it seems sensible to say that agencies are permitted to ignore
trivial risks and to balance the health benefits of regulation against te health costs
of regulation. Where Congress has left things unclear, agencies should have
discretion to move statutes away from (what they reasonably consider to be) the
domain of senselessness. Notice that defended in this modest way, the costbenefit default principles combine substantive ideas about regulatory policy with
institutional ones, in the form of a posture of judicial deference, allowing
agencies room to maneuver.184 Because agencies are specialized in the topic at
hand, and because they have a degree of political accountability, they are
permitted to do what the cost-benefit default principles authorize. If agencies
choose to do otherwise, there is, on the rationale as stated, nothing wrong with
that.
But we should acknowledge here that it is possible to discern two
different strands in the cases establishing the cost-benefit default principles. Call
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 US 204, 208-09 (1988).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315 (2000).
183 Compare the controversial suggestion, in Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed.
1999), that the common law embodies principles of economic efficiency. I am suggesting a more
modest point – not that courts are pursuing efficiency, economically defined, but that they are
converging on a less sectarian, more modest set of ideas, allowing agencies to move in directions
that can be seen as sensible from a wide variety of standpoints.
184 For a powerful attack on unduly complex canons of construction and a plea for simplicity, see
Adrian Vermeule. Interpretive Choice, 75 NY U L Rev 74 (2000). I do not deal here with the
objection that the cost-benefit default principles make statutory interpretation too unruly. As they
operate in the cases, the principles seem reasonably straightforward and not to produce undue
complexity. But it is easy to imagine a situation in which these default principles coexisted with a
number of others, thus making decisions unnecessarily complex.
181
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the first strand antiregulatory, and the second strand technocratic . On the
antiregulatory strand, the principles are best seen as an effort to block
regulation,185 perhaps on the theory that regulation is frequently illegitimate from
the standpoint of liberty, perhaps on the ground that it usually does more harm
than good. The antiregulatory strand links the principles with those prevailing in
the discredited Lochner era,186 where courts used both constitutional and
interpretive principles to limit regulation. By contrast, the technocratic strand
embodies no animus against regulation as such. It is neutral on that question,
assessing regulation only on the basis of what the data show. Indeed, it sees costbenefit analysis as a frequent impetus to regulation, as in the phaseouts of lead
and CFCs.187 For technocrats, the impetus toward cost-benefit analysis is as much
a check on insufficient regulation as it is a limitation on excessive controls.
To the extent that the cost-benefit principles are approved here, it is
because and to the extent that they embody the technocratic strand, enlisting
policy analysis in the service of better regulation. The antiregulatory form is
illegitimate, a form of judicial hubris. But it should not be denied that both
strands are playing a role in the cases. Let us now investigate some details.
B. De Minimis Exceptions and Acceptable Risks
The idea that agencies may make de minimis exceptions is an outgrowth
of the old idea, de minimis non curat lex. If the risk at issue is tiny, the agency is
not required to eliminate it. Much of the rationale here is a kind of implicit costbenefit balancing. If regulation occurs, both private and public resources will
have to be expended in order to ensure compliance. When the benefits of
regulation are trivial, the agency is permitted to refuse to regulate, on the ground
that the costs are likely to outweigh any benefits.188 When the benefits of
regulation are trivial, no one is likely to have anything to complain about if
regulation is foregone. Those who are attempting to complain are likely to be

Of course there is no avoiding “regulation.” What is ordinarily describe as “opposition to
regulation” is in reality no such thing, but approval of that form of regulation that is embodied in
principles of contract, tort, and property law. Nonregulation is not a possibility, short of anarchy.
I use the terminology of “regulation” and “anti-regulation” to conform to common usage. The
real opposition is to specific kinds and forms of regulation.
186 After Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1908).
187 See Richard Benedict, Ozone Diplomacy 63 (1991); Cost-Benefit Analysis at EPA 77-83 (Richard
Morgenstern ed. 1998); id. at 131-64
188 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (DC Cir 1979).
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well-organized private groups with a self-interested agenda, unrelated to the
purposes for which the statute was enacted.189
This understanding has the virtue of helping to account for the courts’
otherwise puzzling refusal to allow EPA to make a de minimis exception under
the color additive provisions of the Delaney Clause.190 Perhaps these decisions
are best attributed to the fact that the statutory terms seem quite unambiguous.
But as one court emphasized, it is unclear if significant costs are actually created
by a decision to ban color additives.191 While the benefits of a ban are low, the
costs are, in the particular circumstances, low as well. If the costs of regulation
are trivial, perhaps a trivial gain from regulation is justified too. The general
point is that trivial risks are unlikely to be worth private and public resources,
they need not be controlled unless Congress has explicitly said that agencies
must control them.
C. Health-Health Tradeoffs
In a way the idea of “health-health tradeoffs” is the simplest of all. If
agencies are imposing health risks at the same time that they are protecting
health, they should, at the very least, be permitted to take this fact into account.
What most matters, after all, is whether risks are being reduced on balance
(though distributional and equitable concerns can complicate this claim, as
discussed below). Other things being equal, it is hardly desirable for government
to reduce the respiratory risks of ground-level ozone if ground-level ozone also
provides significant protection against cancer and cataracts.192 The agency
should be permitted to ask whether this is what it should do, subject to review
for reasonableness.
Now this does not mean that a sensible legislature will inevitably ask
agencies to compare health risks with health benefits. Perhaps an institutional
division of labor is sought, so that some agencies deal with some risks, whereas
other agencies attend to others.193 It is imaginable, for example, that an agency
entrusted with promoting fuel economy is not supposed to consider safety
issues, which are a province of another institution. At least if the two agencies
are not working at cross purposes, and are engaged in some effort at
As plausible examples, see Monsanto Co., supra; Alabama Power Co., supra.
Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987).
191 Id. at 1111.
192 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027, 1052 (DC Cir 1999).
193 See Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note.
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coordination, it is possible that this division of labor makes sense. The only claim
is that when an agency is aggravating one health problem while it is resolving
another, it ought to be permitted to take that factor into account unless Congress
has said otherwise. In any case permission to engage in health-health balancing
helps counteract the constant risk of tunnel vision on the part of regulators.
At this stage it might be asked why, to many people, health-health
analysis seems so much less controversial than cost-benefit analysis. Many
people seem skeptical of the idea that costs should be balanced against lives
saved194; but few people are skeptical of the idea that lives saved should be
balanced against lives lost. The simplest explanation is that people have a great
deal of difficulty in trading off life against dollars, not only cognitively but also
morally, and the very idea of ascribing an explicit monetary value to a
(statistical) life remains controversial.195 When people are asked to weigh health
against health, the mental operation is far less troublesome. People generally
agree that agencies should attempt to save more lives on balance, rather than
fewer. Note that this is a descriptive point about how people tend to think,
intended to help explain what might seem to be an anomaly; it is not a normative
point at all.
D. Costs, Feasibility, and Costs vs. Benefits
Why are agencies presumptively entitled to consider costs?. The basic idea
must be that a “benefits only” approach also reflects a kind of tunnel vision, a
myopic focus on only one of the variety of things that matter. Suppose, for
example, that one approach to regulation would produce a certain level of air
quality benefits, but do so at a cost of $800 million – and that another competing
approach would produce a very slightly lower level of air quality benefits, but do
so at a cost of $150 million. If costs can be made relevant, the agency is permitted

See, eg, Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993).
For intriguing psychological evidence, see Philip Tetlock, Taboo Tradeoffs (unpublished
manuscript 2000). It might well be that the refusal to balance costs and benefits is an
overgeneralization of a sound moral posture in ordinary life. In deciding whether to break a
promise, or to betray a friend, we do not ordinarily balance costs against benefits, at least not in
any simple or direct sense. There is a general understanding that some tradeoffs are indeed
“taboo,” in the sense that certain reasons for action are blocked, not merely outweighed. I
speculate that the opposition to cost-benefit analysis, in government policy, is an
overgeneralization of moral commitments that work well in the private domain. See Jonathan
Baron, Judgment Misguided (1998).
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to do what seems quite sensible: to save the $650 million on the ground that the
benefits of the expenditure would not be high enough to justify the expenditure.
Of course it would be necessary to know a great deal more to know how
to evaluate the particular problem. If the $650 million would mean a significant
loss of jobs, and if the lower air quality benefits would not result in significant
mortality or morbidity effects, it seems most sensible not to expend the
resources. But if the $650 million would mean slightly reduced profits for
producers, or slightly increased prices for a dispensable good, and if the air
quality benefits would mean a nontrivial reduction in respiratory problems for
tens of thousands of asthmatics, the case for more stringent regulation is far
stronger. The point is not that a bare accounting of costs and benefits tells
officials all of what they need to know.196 It is only that a sensible agency is
entitled to, and does, “consider” the costs of regulation. Congress should not be
understood to have banned agencies from doing this. If Congress has a
particular reason to require otherwise, it is permitted to do exactly that.
Ideas of this sort help support the closely related idea that agencies are
presumptively permitted to compare costs against benefits, and also to consider
whether compliance is feasible.197 As we will see in more detail, the feasibility
constraint is both ambiguous and from the normative perspective somewhat
crude, because there is no identifiable point at which regulation becomes “not
feasible.” But a feasibility constraint, crude though it is, can be defended in the
same basic way as the presumption against mandatory control of insignificant
risks: If compliance is not feasible, there is a good chance that regulation is not
worthwhile. The least that can be said is that if regulation is so costly that it
would force many companies to go out of business, with inevitable adverse
effects for workers, the agency ought to have a very strong reason for imposing
it.
V.

Agency Permission versus Agency Requirements

Thus far we have seen what agencies are permitted to do, if Congress is
silent on the point. But it is necessary to distinguish between cases in which an
agency attempts to do what cost-benefit principles permit and cases in which an
agency refuses to do what courts are permitting. We know that for the agency,
See Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, Yale LJ (1999) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is only a
decision procedure).
197 See supra.
196
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no legal problem will arise in the first set of cases. What about the second? Might
the default principles sometimes require agencies to follow a particular course?
A. The Framework
To answer this question, some brief background is in order. Chevron v.
NRDC,198 the dominant case in the area, sets out the familiar two-step inquiry for
judicial review of agency decisions. The first question (“step one”) is whether
Congress has “directly decided the precise question at issue” – more simply,
whether Congress has unambiguously banned what the agency proposes to
do.199 Under Chevron, agencies are generally permitted to construe ambiguous
statutes as they see fit. It follows that even without a cost-benefit default
principle, agencies should be permitted to consider costs so long as the statute is
ambiguous on the point. When Chevron is combined with the default principle,
the overall lesson is exceedingly straightforward: Agencies are permitted to
consider costs when Congress has not said that they may not.
Under Chevron, however, the issue is not finished upon a finding that
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue. It remains to
ask whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable (“step
two”).200 When the American Trucking Association court held that the EPA was
required to consider the benefits as well as the risks of a pollutant, it did so partly
on the ground that the agency’s interpretation to the contrary was not reasonable
(because it was, in the court’s view, “bizarre”201). It is therefore possible that even
if an agency’s decision does not violate Chevron step one (because the statute is
ambiguous), it will nonetheless violate step 2, if the decision can be shown to be
arbitrary or “bizarre.”
B. The Framework Applied
Suppose that the agency has refused to allow a de minimis exemption, or
engage in health-health comparisons, or to consider costs when the statute allows
it to do so. If the agency has refused to do what the cost-benefit principles
permit it to do, the analysis would proceed in the following steps.

467 US 837 (1984).
Id. at 842.
200 Id.
201 173 F.3d 1027, 1052
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199
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1. The first question would involve Chevron step one: Has EPA violated
unambiguous congressional instructions, or transgressed some judgment made
“directly” by Congress? At first glance, the answer, by hypothesis, will be No.
The statute is ambiguous rather than clear. The only possible response is that the
cost-benefit default rule now operates as a kind of canon of construction, serving
as part of the inquiry in Chevron step 1.
The argument is unquestionably adventurous, but not as much so as it
might appear. Many canons of construction now work in precisely that way.202
Consider, for example, the following canons: statutes will not be understood to
apply outside the territorial borders of the United States203; statutes will not be
understood to apply retroactively204; statutes will not be taken to raise serious
constitutional questions.205 In all these cases, agency interpretations do not
prevail under Chevron step 1, not because Congress has expressed its will
clearly, but because Congress is required to speak with clarity if it wishes
agencies to act in the way that they seek. Perhaps the cost-benefit default
principle should be understood in similar terms.
This is indeed possible, but it would require a significant stretch from
existing law. The canons discussed above have a degree of longevity, indeed a
straightforward justification from longstanding traditions.206 The cost-benefit
default principles have not yet acquired the status of the canons of construction
that operate as part of Chevron step 1. It is therefore exceedingly doubtful that an
agency’s refusal to proceed in the manner suggested by the cost-benefit default
principles would be struck down under step 1.207
2. The second question would involve Chevron step 2: Is the agency’s
interpretation of the statute “reasonable”? I suggest that the foregoing
considerations, supporting the default rules in general, suggest the basis for a
particular presumption: The agency’s interpretation is to be presumed
unreasonable if it interprets the statute to fail to make de minimis exemptions, to
See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy XX (4th ed. 2000).
203 EEOC v Arabian American Oil, 499 US 244, 248 (1991).
204 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 US 204, 208-09 (1988).
205 DeBartolo v. Florida East Coast, 485 US 568 (1988).
206 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997) (defending canons if and only if they are
vindicated by tradition).
207 Evidence to this effect comes from International Union, UAW v. OSHA 37 F.3d 605 (DC Cir
1994) (upholding agency decision not to make cost-benefit analysis the basis for decision under a
statute that, in the court’s view, would have allowed to the agency to do this).
202
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disallow health-health tradeoffs, not to consider costs or feasibility, to regulate
insignificant risks, or to ban cost-benefit balancing.208 Of these various
possibilities, the presumption of unreasonableness is strongest when the agency
is attempting to regulate a de minimis risk or refusing to consider health-health
tradeoffs. In such cases, the agency’s decision seems most obviously
unreasonable. Why should expenditures be required for trivial risks? Why
should the agency be permitted to increase overall risks? These questions do not
have obvious answers.
The argument that agencies would be unreasonable to reject the other
default principles is less clear. But even in such cases, any reasonable judgment
will ordinarily be based on some kind of weighing of costs and benefits, and not
on an inquiry into benefits alone.209 Return to Michigan v. EPA, and suppose that
in some states, the costs of reducing the “significant contribution” would be
exceedingly high, whereas the benefits would be low, in light of the fact that the
risks associated with the relevant concentrations of ozone are not severe. If the
costs would be high and the benefits low, on what rationale should be the EPA
refuse even to consider the former? Here too there appears to be no good answer.
Notice that what is involved here is a presumption only, and it is
rebuttable. It is possible to imagine agency explanations that would show why
its view – to reject one or another of the cost-benefit default principles -- is
reasonable. It is that question to which I now turn.
C. Rebutting the Presumption
In several contexts, Congress, as well as agencies and courts, could
reasonably find the default principles inapplicable. The following catalogue is
intended to identify circumstances in which agencies might sensibly decide not
to go in the direction suggested by the default principles – and also in which a
reasonable legislature might ban agencies from going in that direction.
1. Regulating de minimis risks: the case of low benefits and
administrative difficulties. Suppose that an agency has discretion to
interpret the relevant statute so as to allow exemptions of de minimis
Not that there was no challenge to the agency’s decision under Chevron step 2 in id., though
the court’s reasoning suggests that the challenge would have failed.
209 But see id. (upholding a significant risk/feasibility reading of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, notwithstanding a previous decision suggesting that cost-benefit balancing would
have been a permissible reading).
208
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risks for (as an illustration) carcinogenic color additives in food.
Suppose that the agency refuses to interpret the statute this way,
because (a) the benefits of color food additives are generally low
(noncarcinogenic color additives will do about as well), (b) as a matter
of science, it is not always simple to distinguish between weak and
strong carcinogens, and (c) a flat rule will be simpler to administer. At
least at first glance, this sort of explanation seems fully reasonable. It
would distinguish the case from one in which the agency attempts to
interpret the OSHA statute in such a way as to call for costly regulation
of insignificant risks.
2. Regulating risks that might or might not be de minimis: the case of
scientific ignorance. Suppose that the agency attempts to regulate
risks that (it agrees) cannot be shown to be significant. Suppose that it
contends not that it will understand the statute to cover demonstrably
insignificant or demonstrably de minimis risks, but instead to cover
instead risks that, in light of existing scientific information, might be
small but might be large -- a distinction that cannot be made with
existing tools and in light of existing scientific understandings. In other
words, the agency interprets the statute to allow regulation where the
benefits might be significant, but cannot be shown to be significant
given existing knowledge. This, in short, is a case where there is a wide
range of expected benefits, from quite low to quite high, and where
science cannot choose a probable “point” along the range (not an
uncommon situation; see tables 1 and 2 for examples).
This does not seem to be an unreasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute. Certainly the agency should be required to identify
the range of potential benefits, so as to ensure that the possible gains,
discounted by the probability that they will be realized, is sufficient to
make regulation worthwhile. It is not hard to imagine cases of this
kind; table 2 provides examples here as well. The basic point is that
when scientific understanding is primitive, it can be perfectly
reasonable to regulate risks that might be small but might be large.
Indeed, such regulation might even survive cost-benefit balancing,
notwithstanding the real possibility that when more is known, the risk
will turn out to be de minimis.
3. Disregarding costs at one stage of a multistage inquiry. Might it be
reasonable for an agency to interpret a statute not to allow
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consideration of costs? In some cases, this would indeed be reasonable.
Recall that under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is supposed to set
standards at the level that, with an “adequate margin of safety,” are
“requisite to protect the public health.”210 At first glance it might
appear quite unreasonable for the agency not to consider costs if it has
the discretion to do so. Whether it is worthwhile to produce a certain
level of benefits would seem to depend, at least in part, on the cost of
achieving those benefits. But suppose that the EPA urges (as it has for
a number of years, and as the Supreme Court has approved211) that
costs will be considered not in setting standards in the first instance
(where health is the sole consideration), but at other, later stages, in the
development of state implementation plans and in insistence on
deadlines for compliance. In such a system, the EPA would say that
national ambient air quality standards are based only on an inquiry
into issues of health, that this is a benefits-based judgment, but that the
decision how and when to meet those standards, made through
complex procedures at the state and federal levels, will consider costs
as well as benefits.
In fact this is how the Clean Air Act now operates.212 National
standards are issued in what is at least nominally a cost-blind manner,
but costs emphatically and opening play a part at other stages of the
process, in the design and enforcement of state implementation plans.
Whether or not it is ultimately convincing, this kind of procedural
defense of “health only” judgments seems at least plausible. From this
it follows that even if the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act are
taken to be ambiguous,213 it would be reasonable, under Chevron step
2, to understand national standard-setting to be cost-blind, not because
cost-blindness is itself reasonable (it isn’t), but because costs are taken
into account at later stages of a multistage inquiry.214 Whether it would

42 USC 7409(b).
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, S. Ct. (Feb. 28, 2001)..
212 See 42 USC 7410; Portney, supra note.
213 I do not believe that they are, for reasons given in Lead Industries, supra, and followed in
American Trucking Association, supra.
214 From this it follows that the Supreme Court properly rejected the plea for cost-consciousness
in American Trucking Association, supra, not by rejecting cost-benefit default rules, but by
invoking the clarity of the statutory text and the fact that taken as a whole, the system for
implementing national ambient air quality standards is far from cost-blind. Of course this is not
a claim that as a matter of policy, the current system is optimal. For discussion, see Marc Landy et
al., The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions (2d ed. 1996).
210
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be better for costs to be considered throughout is an issue on which
reasonable people can differ. This is a highly pragmatic question, on
which general enthusiasm for cost-benefit balancing is not decisive.
4. Disregarding particular costs as statutorily irrelevant. There are other
arenas in which costs might reasonably be disregarded; at least
agencies might disregard costs of a certain kind. Suppose, for example,
that the FAA concluded that the needs of the air tour industry were
entitled to no weight in issuing regulations controlling noise at the
Grand Canyon. Under a different administration, the FAA might
believe that the statute is best understood to ensure that those who
enjoy the Grand Canyon can do so with a minimum of noise -- and
that the adverse effects on the air tour industry are irrelevant, even if
this means that fewer people will be able to enjoy the Grand Canyon.
At first glance, this is an entirely reasonable judgment. Whee Congress
has been unclear, administrations and administrators might make
different decisions on that question.
5. Disregarding feasibility as part of overall balancing. Is it ever
reasonable for an agency to ignore the question whether regulation is
feasible for the industry? Might the FAA choose to interpret an
ambiguous statute so as to impose an air quality regulation that would
not be feasible for the air tour industry over the Grand Canyon, so that
the relevant companies could not stay in business? At first glance,
feasibility seems relevant; but it is possible to imagine cases in which
an agency might reasonably choose to interpret a statute to allow rules
that are not feasible. The agency might believe that it is more
important to reduce noise levels than to allow the continued operation
of the air tour industry. When judgments of this kind are made, the
agency is effectively engaging in a kind of cost-benefit balancing, one
that justifies regulation that is not feasible. Of course an agency might
engage in technology-forcing, though usually this approach depends
on a judgment that regulation is indeed feasible, because more
advanced technologies are feasible to develop.
6. Rights and irreversibility. Thus far the discussion has emphasized
pragmatic or instrumental considerations. But are there contexts in
which the cost-benefit default principles are inapplicable in principle?
In many domains, of course, cost-benefit balancing fails to describe the
operation of law; rights-based thinking often “blocks” resorts to costs,
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or at least costs of a certain kind.215 Ordinarily ideas of this sort play a
role in constitutional law,216 where certain “costs” are off limits. For
example, the costs undoubtedly associated with politically
controversial speech are not a legitimate basis for regulating such
speech. Those costs are entitled to no weight at all; it is not as if they
count, but are insufficiently high.
Such thinking is not foreign to regulatory policy. The most vivid
example is the Endangered Species Act,217 which forbids agency from
engaging in action that would threaten members of endangered species
even if a balancing test would appear to justify the action.218 In holding
that the statute disallows balancing, the Court relied on what is said was
the unambiguous meaning of the text.219 But as Justice Powell showed in
dissent, the language was not so clear as to disallow invocation of a strong
default principle, one that would justify a degree of balancing.220 Can the
outcome in the case be explained in a legal system pervaded by costbenefit default principles?
Perhaps it cannot be. Perhaps the Court’s decision is an anachronism,
inconsistent with the more contemporary judicial enthusiasm for
balancing. But there is another explanation. The Endangered Species Act
is concerned with preventing genuinely irreversible losses, and at least in
the context of human activities that cause extinction, perhaps the statute is
best taken to be rooted in a theory of rights, one that rebuts the
presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing. Now it is possible that
some kind of “meta” balancing justifies a flat prohibition on actions that
would destroy members of an endangered species. Perhaps that higher
form of cost-benefit balancing calls for a refusal to engage in cost-benefit
balancing in particular cases. The benefits might be thought to be so high,
and the costs usually so low, as to support such a prohibition, disallowing
balancing each time. But this way of understanding the statute seems to
misconceive its foundations, which lie in a judgment that human beings

See the discussion of exclusionary reasons in Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1985).
See Richard Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725 (1999).
217 16 USC 1531 et seq.
218 TVA v. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978).
219 Id. at 162.
220 Id. at 166 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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should not knowingly bring about the extinction of other species,221 at
least in the absence of truly extraordinary circumstances.222
It is possible to generalize from this example. Where regulatory policy
is designed to ensure against irreversible damage, or otherwise to prevent
the violation of rights, the cost-benefit default principles might well be
displaced. In most domains of regulatory policy, however, what is
involved is not the danger of irreversible loss, but instead issues of degree,
and hence the presumption remains intact.
VI.

Unsettled Questions: Specifying the Principles

The cost-benefit default principles leave many open questions. They are
abstract and general. Courts have done extremely little to particularize them;
agencies have done somewhat more, but they have made only a start.223 OMB has
set out “best practices” for agency use224; because of the importance and
generally high quality of OMB’s guidance, excerpts are included as an Appendix.
It is here that a great deal of law will be made in the next decades. I offer a few
remarks on the crucial issues.
A. The Incipient Common Law of Acceptable Risks
What makes a risk “significant” or “de minimis”? Here the law is extremely
ill-developed. Perhaps we can find some agreed-upon standards for labeling a
risk de minimis. If the risk is less than that created by eating a moderate number
of peanuts with legally permitted aflotoxin levels, or from living in Denver rather
than New York for a week every year, the case seems relatively easy. Risks of this
little are the kind that people ignore each day. But how should we evaluate (say)
a cancer risk, from (say) a lifetime exposure to a certain carcinogenic substance,
of one in one million? One in 100,000? One in ten million? Does it matter if the
exposed population is large or small?

See Percival et al., supra note, at 1085-1089.
In the wake of TVA v. Hill, Congress amended section 7 of the Act to establish a special
committee, known as the “God Squad,” to make exemptions, and thus to permit action to go
forward, under extraordinary circumstances. In the decades since the amendment, no wholesale
exemption has ever been granted.
223 See the overview at http://www.whitehouse.gov/media/pdf/2000fedreg-report.pdf; see also
the discussion of agency practice in Adler and Posner, supra note.
224 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html
221
222
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These are the pivotal questions. For guidance, it might be noted that the
International Commission on Radiological Protection recommends that
environmental factors should not be allowed to cause an incremental cancer risk,
for those exposed over a lifetime, of 3 in 1000 or more.225 But the practice of
American agencies is highly variable, with the EPA’s acceptable range varying,
under different programs, from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000.226 In the Benzene
Case, the plurality of the Supreme Court attempted to provide some clarification,
making a distinction between two quantitatively different levels of risk. If the
risk of getting cancer from drinking a glass of water is one in a billion, the
plurality said, it could not possibly be considered significant. 227 By contrast, a
fatality risk of 1/1000 from regular inhalation of gasoline vapors “might well” be
considered significant.228 OSHA has built on this simple idea in issuing its own
regulations. Thus the agency has said that a lifetime risk of 1.64/1000 will be
counted as significant, whereas a lifetime risk of 0.6 in 100,000 “may be
approaching a level that can be viewed as safe.”229
This is certainly a start, and in light of the Supreme Court’s statements,
perhaps OSHA’s approach is sufficient to survive judicial scrutiny. Certainly an
effort at quantification is a helpful way of clarifying the basis for the agency’s
decision, especially laudable in light of the slipperiness of the idea of
‘significance.” But many questions might be asked. In deciding whether a risk is
trivial or significant, it would seem important to ask not only about the level of
the risk faced by each person, but also about the size of the exposed
population.230 If two people in the United States face a lifetime risk of 2/10,000,
perhaps the risk should not be deemed significant in light of the fact that it is
overwhelmingly likely that no fatalities will be suffered. We could easily imagine
a challenge to a decision to treat such a risk as “significant” as a matter of law.231
Certainly the agency should explain any failure to take account of the small
number of exposed people -- even though it would probably be reasonable, as a
matter of law, for the agency to concern itself with probabilities faced by
individuals, at least if it is not permitted to engage in cost-benefit balancing.
March Sadowitz and John Graham, A Survey of Permitted Residual Cancer Risks, 6 RISKS 17
(1995).
226 Id.
227 See 448 US at 655.
228 See 448 US at 655.
229 52 Fed Reg 46,168, 46,234 (1987).
230 Agency attention to the size of the exposed population is strongly urged in James Hamilton
and W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks (1999).
231Id.
225
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At the same time, a statistically small risk, if faced by large numbers of
people, might well be deemed significant. If twenty million people face a lifetime
risk of 1/200,000, one hundred people are expected to die -- far from a trivial
number. We could easily imagine a challenge to an agency decision to treat the
latter risk as “insignificant”; indeed that challenge should probably succeed. The
point raises serious doubts about the Supreme Court plurality’s confidence that a
risk of one in a billion, from drinking a glass of water, could not be deemed
significant. If each person drinks five glasses of water per day, and if there are
260 million Americans, the one-in-a-billion risk no longer seems so small,
converted into expected annual fatalities (474.5, hardly an insignificant number).
We should therefore conclude that it is at least reasonable for agencies to
consider risks to be “significant,” and not de minimis, if the probability is very
low but the exposed population quite large. It is also reasonable to suggest that if
the probability is very low but the exposed population sufficiently large, a high
number of expected fatalities should require the agency to consider the risk
“significant” as a matter of law.
There is an additional problem. Both OSHA and the Supreme Court seem to
focus on the “lifetime” risk – that is, the risk that would come from being
exposed to a substance for all of one’s working life. Under OSHA, it does seem
that this focus is required by the statute, at least for toxic substances, for which
the relevant provision is expressly drawn in terms of lifetime exposure.232 But in
the abstract, and under other provisions, we should not be focussing on the risk,
of fatality or anything else, that would come from a lifetime of exposure, except
to the extent that all, most, or many people actually have a lifetime of exposure.
Imagine, for example, that almost all workers in the relevant industry are
exposed, not for their lifetimes, but for five years or less. What risk do they face?
This is the crucial question. Perhaps the risk, for them, is a small fraction of the
lifetime risk. Sensible policy requires the government to reduce the risks that
people actually face, not the risk that people fancifully face. When an agency has
discretion, the agency should look not at lifetime risk, but at actual risk.
What all this suggests is that when agencies are asking whether risks are
significant, they ought to move in the direction of setting out a range of
“expected benefits,” in terms of mortality, morbidity, and other relevant
variables.233 These variables could be aggregated into some sort of total number,
232
233

See 5 USC
This is the direction suggested in ATA v. EPA, 175 F3d 1027, 1039-1040 (1999).
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below which a risk would be treated as insignificant. Of course there will be a
large degree of guesswork in generating the relevant numbers. Of course too
there will be a degree of arbitrariness in choosing the precise point at which risks
are no longer significant. But without movement in the direction of
quantification, it will not be possible to produce informed, transparent, and
consistent policy.234 Thus an effort to quantify the level of risk that would be
deemed acceptable would replace thc current system, with its high degree of
inconsistency and guesswork, with something like a common law of acceptable
risks.235
B. The Meaning of Feasibility: No “On-Off” Switch
What does it mean to say that regulation must be “feasible”? In the abstract, a
requirement that regulation be “feasible” might seem to invite cost-benefit
balancing. In the private sector, a “feasibility study” is essentially an exercise in
cost-benefit balancing. But as we have seen, a feasibility requirement involves no
balancing of costs and benefits.236 It asks instead about cost-only inquiry into
whether achievement of the regulatory goal is “practicable.”237
Assume, for example, that a regulation would cost $800 million, and that in
the process it would save 10 lives per year; assume also that the exposed
population is relatively small, so that each of the exposed workers faces a lifetime
risk of well over 1 in 1000. It is easy to imagine that this regulation would be
entirely feasible, in the sense that the industry would face no technical problems
in meeting it, and also in the sense that it would be practicable for industry to
bear the cost. But it is also easy to imagine that such a regulation would fail costbenefit analysis, in the sense that $800 million expense would not be justified by
the (relatively lower) monetized savings. If a statistical life is valued at $5
million, for example, the benefits ($50 million) would be only one-eighth the cost.
But it would be wrong to think that cost-benefit analysis is more
“antiregulatory” than a feasibility constraint. We can easily imagine a regulation
that might not be feasible, but that might satisfy a requirement of cost-benefit
balancing. Suppose, for example, that a regulation would cost $2 billion, that
industry could not bear that cost without many business failures, but that the

See James Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks (1999).
See Sadowitz and Graham, supra note.
236 ATMI v. Donovan, 452 US 490 (1981).
237 Id.
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regulation would save 5000 lives. In some cases, the cost-benefit requirement is
more protective, not less protective, of intended beneficiaries of regulatory
programs.
So far, perhaps, things are clear enough. But there is a problem here as
well. Most important: Feasibility is not an on-off switch. Any significant
increase in costs is likely to prove “not feasible” for at least some companies. As
the costs increase, the number of companies for whom the regulation proves “not
feasible” will increase too. In these circumstances, it seems extremely artificial to
say that at a certain point, regulation becomes “not feasible.” Perhaps there is a
set point at which regulation, by virtue of its stringency, establishes a sudden,
large-scale increase in the number of companies who cannot bear the cost of
regulatory controls while continuing in business. But it is more likely that as the
costs grow, the number of companies who cannot bear the cost grows too,
perhaps with several specific points at which that number spikes upwards. In
these circumstances, what sense is made by a “feasibility” constraint? At first
glance, very little. Just as safety is not an absolute, but a matter of degree, so too
for feasibility. Law that says otherwise appears to substitute a comforting but
misleading formula for a serious confrontation with the issues at stake.
Perhaps there is an intelligible answer here. Perhaps Congress wants to
say that for most regulations, companies must comply, unless a large number of
them can show that they cannot comply and continue. And certainly this is a
relatively simple inquiry in most cases. What makes little sense is the suggestion
that agencies can pick a single point that is “feasible,” and go to, but not beyond,
that point.
In these circumstances, how can we account for the evident popularity of
requirements that regulation be “feasible” or “achievable”? There are several
possibilities, suggesting that the feasibility standard might be justified by
reference to institutional considerations. From the standpoint of those concerned
with safety and the environment, a cost-benefit standard might be thought to
introduce undue opportunities for industry to stall the process, perhaps because
of the prospect and actuality of judicial review. 238 A requirement that regulation
must be “feasible’ greatly improves agency’s chances in court. In fact this
conclusion is well-supported by the record of agencies on appeal; no agency has

For evidence, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (invalidating
asbestos ban).
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ever lost a challenge to the feasibility of its regulation, while cost-benefit
requirements have proved troublesome for agencies in court.239
This is a point about the goals of supporters of environmental regulation.
From the standpoint of Congress, there is a separate point. A statute that
expressly refers to cost-benefit balancing seems to invite complaints about the
decision to trade off lives for dollars; hence statutes that embody CBA are
unpopular in many circles. (It is noteworthy here that none of the actual and
seriously considered enactments involving cost-benefit balancing has ever set out
numbers for valuing regulatory benefits.) Legislators who seek to avoid
complaints about CBA, while also seeking to impose a constraint on excessive
regulation, might naturally be drawn to feasibility requirements. From the
standpoint of industry, perhaps “feasibility” statutes are not so troublesome if it
is possible to maintain control over the agency’s docket and over appropriations,
so as to ensure that draconian statutes are, in practice, far less than that.
These points help explain the appeal of feasibility constraints. But they
still do not tell us what such constraints mean. The best answer, not entirely
satisfactory, is that a regulation becomes infeasible if it would result in
significant dislocations in the industry, in the form of large numbers of business
failures, substantial losses of jobs, or the equivalent.240 Ideas of this sort are
qualitative, rather than quantitative, and in implementation, they leave a great
deal of discretion to agencies. What might be expected in the future is a more
quantitative account from agencies implementing regulations that are said to be
feasible, or refusing to impose regulations said to be infeasible.
C. Considering Costs
What of principles (or statutes) that ask agencies to “take into
consideration” costs (and other relevant factors)? Statutes of this kind typically
include an “achievability” constraint as well, one that operates, in practice, in the
same way as a feasibility requirement. What is added by the idea that agencies
should also take costs into consideration?

See, eg, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); Aqua Slide N’ Dive
Corp.
240 See, eg, United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F2d 1189 (5th Cir 1980); Building and
Construction Trades v. OSHA, 838 F2d 1258 (DC Cir 1988); NCP v. Brock, 825 F2d 482 (DC Cir
1987.
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The answer seems to be that such provisions give agencies the discretion
not to go to the full extent of feasibility if the costs of doing so are
disproportionately high. Suppose, for example, that a regulation would cost $800
million and that it would save 10 lives annually. Suppose too that it is entirely
feasible. If the agency is permitted to take costs into consideration, presumably it
is permitted to impose a less intrusive regulation, or perhaps not to regulate at
all. The foregoing sentence is qualified because the idea that costs must be taken
“into consideration” does not say how much weight costs must have; it does not
say, by itself, to what extent agencies must treat costs as relevant to the ultimate
decision. Presumably it would be unlawful for an agency to ignore costs
altogether. If the agency were permitted to do this, the “consideration”
requirement would be empty. At a minimum, then, the agency must discuss cost
and explain its decision in light of cost. Similarly, an agency that is allowed to
“consider” costs, but need not take account of feasibility, is authorized to soften
regulation by selecting less expensive and also less effective means.241 Hard
questions would arise if an agency authorized to “consider” costs chooses means
that are much less expensive but also much less effective.
This is a procedural understanding of the “consideration” requirement,
one that has precedent under other statutes.242 But is there a substantive
requirement as well? Must an agency give some kind of weight to costs, in
addition to discussing them? The best answer is “yes” to both questions. An
agency decision would be unlawful if it gave no weight whatsoever to costs, as,
for example, through the choice of a regulation that would do only trivially more
good than one that would be 50% less costly. An agency decision would also be
doubtful if it made costs an overriding factor as, for example, by choosing a
regulation that is slightly less expensive (say, $1 million annually) but also much
less effective (say, because it would leave 30 additional deaths annually).
On this view, a requirement that an agency take costs into consideration
falls short of cost-benefit analysis, in the sense that the agency is expected to give
principal weight to the initially identified factor, and from there to make
adjustments because of costs. An agency would run into difficulty if it
transformed costs into the overriding statutory factor or if it gave costs no
substantive consideration at all. These are the polar cases for administrative

Michigan v. EPA, supra.
Most notably the National Environmental Policy Act. See Stryker’s Bay v. Karlen, 444 US 223
(1980).
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illegality. Cases that fall between the poles should present hard line-drawing
questions, but no serious conceptual issues.
D. Of Costs and Benefits
It remains to discuss the largest problem of all. If cost-benefit balancing is
required, what is an agency permitted to do? What is it prohibited from doing?
Of course there are hard issues of valuation here. If an agency values a life at $10
million, it will produce outcomes very different from those that would be follow
if it valued a life at $500,000. Is an agency permitted to value a life at, say, $100
million, or at $50,000?243
1. Basic issues of valuation: the standard approach. For several decades,
agencies have undertaken cost-benefit analysis of major regulations, even when
cost-benefit analysis is not the basis for decision but is merely a matter of
informing the public about the consequences of proposed courses of action.244 But
how are costs and benefits to be calculated? In principle, the issue is often easier
to resolve on the cost side, though the practical problems here can be very
serious, especially in light of industry’s incentive to overestimate costs. With
respect to benefits, the now-standard approach involves an effort to calculate
people’s “willingness to pay” for the various goods at stake.245 Sophisticated
(though still controversial246) methods are available for this purpose.247
There remains a good deal of variation across agencies, with statistical
lives being valued at between $1.5 million and $5.8 million.248 With respect to
statistical lives, consider the following table249:

See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
244 For an overview, see Richard Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reconceiving the Regulatory State,
62 U Chi L Rev 1 (1995).
245 This approach is challenged in many places. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and
Economics (1993).
246 See Markets, Mortality, and Work (1998).
247 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1992).
248 See Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, supra note. EPA is generally using a number of $4.8
million per statistical life saved. See Section 812 Retrospective (1997).
249 Borrowed from Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000).
243
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Table 3: Valuations of Life

AGENCY

REGULATION

CITATION

Department of Transportation –
Federal Aviation Administration

Proposed Establishment of the
Harlingen Airport Radar Service
Area, TX
Pathogen Reduction: Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control
Point Systems
Regulations Restricting the Sale
and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in
Pilot Training, Testing, and
Checking and at Training Centers
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone

55 FR 32064
August 6, 1990

Department of Agriculture – Food
Safety and Inspection Service
Department of Health and
Human Services – Food and Drug
Administration
Department of Transportation –
Federal Aviation Administration
Environmental Protection Agency

Department of Health and
Human Services – Food and Drug
Administration
Department of Transportation –
Federal Aviation Administration
Department of Agriculture – Food
and Nutrition Service
Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Health and
Human Services – Food and Drug
Administration
Department of Health and
Human Services – Public Health
Service, Food and Drug
Administration
Environmental Protection Agency

Environmental Protection Agency

Environmental Protection Agency

Proposed Rules to Amend the
Food Labeling Regulations
Financial Responsibility
Requirements for Licensed
Launch Activities
Proposed National School Lunch
Program and School Breakfast
Program
National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter
National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone
Medical Devices: Current Good
Manufacturing Practice
Quality Mammography
Standards

Requirements for Lead-Based
Paint Activities in Target
Housing and Child-Occupied
Facilities
National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations: Disinfectants
and Disinfection Byproducts
Radon in Drinking Water Health
Risk Reduction and Cost
Analysis

VALUE
($ mil.)
1.5

61 FR 38806
July 25, 1996

1.6

61 FR 44396
August 28,
1996

2.5

61 FR 34508
July 2, 1996

2.7

53 FR 30566
August 12,
1988
56 FR 60856
November 27,
1991
61 FR 38992
July 25, 1996

3

59 FR 30218
June 10, 1994

1.5, 3.0

62 FR 38652
July 18, 1997
62 FR 38856
July 18, 1996
61 FR 52602
October 7,
1996
62 FR 55852
October 28,
1997

4.8

61 FR 45778
August 29,
1996

5.5

63 FR 69390
December 16,
1998
64 FR 9560
February 26,
1999

5.6

3

3

4.8
5

5

5.8
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Notwithstanding these variations, willingness to pay is the general basis for
undertaking calculations. It is on the basis of this sort of analysis that the EPA
compiled the following table,250 which can be taken as representative:
Table 4: Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (Mean Values)
Health Endpoint
Mortality
Life saved
Life year extended
Hospital Admissions:
All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages
Pneumonia, age < 65
COPD, age > 65
Ischemic Heart Disease, age < 65
Congestive Heart Failure, age > 65
Emergency Visits for Asthma
Chronic Bronchitis
Upper Respiratory Symptoms
Lower Respiratory Symptoms
Acute Bronchitis
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19)
Asthma
Shortness of Breath
Sinusitis and Hay Fever
Work Loss Days
Restricted Activity Days (RAD)
Minor RAD
Respiratory RAD
Worker Productivity
Visibility: residential
Recreational
Household Soiling Damage

Mean WTP Value per Incident
(1990 $)
$4.8 million
$120,000
$12,700
$13,400
$15,900
$ 20,600
$ 16,600
$9,000
$260,000
$19
$12
$45
$18
$32
$5.30
Not monetized
$83
$38
not monetized
$1 per worker per 10% change in ozone
$14 per unit decrease in deciview per
household
Range of $7.30 to $11 per unit decrease in
deciview per household (see U.S. EPA, 1997a)
$2.50 per household per g/m3

Innovative Strategies Group, Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis,
Ozone and Particulates (1998).

250
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To become intelligible, of course, these numbers must be combined with
an assessment of the problems that would be averted with various approaches to
regulation. As an example of such an assessment, consider the following:
Table 5: Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 g/m3 ) 99th Percentile
National Annual Health Incidence Reductions
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS: (year = 2010)
ENDPOINT
Partial Attainment
Scenario
Annual PM2.5
50
( g/m3)
150
Daily PM2.5
3
( g/m )
*1. Mortality: short-term exposure
360
long-term exposure
340
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
6,800
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
190
all resp. (ages 65+)
470
pneumonia (ages 65+)
170
COPD (ages 65+)
140
*4. Congestive heart failure
130
*5. Ischemic heart disease
140
*6. Acute Bronchitis
1,100
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
10,400
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
5,300
shortness of breath
18,300
asthma attacks
8,800
*9. Work Loss Days
106,000
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)
879,000
A simple exercise of multiplication, putting the two tables together, will
generate monetized benefits, which can then be compared with monetized costs.
Of course it is possible to challenge the numbers in both tables. Perhaps the
agency has understated or overstated the number of lives saved or chronic
bronchitis cases; perhaps the agency has overvalued or undervalued the dollar
value of life or other health benefits. In fact evidence suggests that prospective
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estimates are bound to contain serious errors. The Office of Technology
Assessment, asked in 1992 to evaluate the accuracy of OSHA’s prospective
estimates, found many mistakes.251 But the basic method increasingly dominates
administrative practice.
2. Legal floors and ceilings. When would a given cost-benefit ratio be held
to be unlawful? The simplest answer is that when the costs significantly exceed
the benefits, when these are properly measured. A reasonable agency might
begin with numbers near the middle of both market valuations252 and
government valuations253 – in the case of a statistical life, somewhere between $3
million and $7 million.254 If an agency seeks to deviate from those numbers, it
should explain why. The basic idea is that there should be a presumption in
favor of adherence to the normal range, with an explanation of departures from
the numbers thus indicated. And if the agency seeks to go forward with a
regulation whose costs significantly exceed benefits, it should have to explain
why it is doing that.
A legitimate risk in allowing departures is that the stated rationale will
conceal an effort to placate powerful private groups not having a strong claim to
See OMB, 1999 Report to Congress, at 40-43. A table, id. at 41, contains an illuminating
summary:

251

Estimated Costs and Benefits of OSHA Rules: Prospective vs. Retrospective
Regulation
Year
Estimated Costs
Estimated Benefits
Issued
Vinyl Chloride (a)
1974
Overestimated by a factor of four
Not clear
Cotton Dust (a)
1978
Overestimated by a factor of three
Overestimated by more than
a factor of two
Lead (Secondary
1978
Capital costs significantly
Overestimated the
Smelters)
underestimated
importance of engineering
controls in achieving benefits
Ethylene Oxide
1984
About right
Not clear
(Hospitals) (a)
Formaldehyde (Metal
1987
Over by a factor of two (although
Not clear
Foundries)
costs of engineering controls
considerably underestimated)
Grain Handling
1987
Not clear
Not clear
PSDI Power Presses (b)
1988
Underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, or both
Powered Platforms (b)
1989
Underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, or both

See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J Legal Stud (2000).
See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 30-31 (1999); Matthew
Adler and Eric Posner, supra note.
254 But see Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, U Chi
L Rev (forthcoming 2001) (urging inflation of these numbers).
252
253
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governmental assistance.255 Notwithstanding this risk, there are several possible
grounds for making adjustments. For example, an agency might make a
reasonable upward adjustment if it believes that children are largely at risk -perhaps because more life-years are at stake, perhaps because children are
unable to protect themselves and hence have a special equitable claim to
government resources.256 A downward adjustment would similarly be lawful if
the agency finds that mostly old people are at risk, so that any extensions of lives
would produce a low level of savings in terms of life-years. Or the agency might
reasonably conclude that special attention should be given to risks faced by poor
people or African-Americans, on the ground that existing injustice is
compounded in a situation in which health and environmental dangers are thus
concentrated.
Agencies should also be permitted to take into account the fact that people
care about relative economic position, not only absolute economic position, and
thus to adjust market valuations upwards.257 And the agency could reasonably
employ “incidence analysis” to conclude that regulation should go forward
notwithstanding the fact tha benefits exceed costs (see the reference to
distributional considerations in OMB’s “best practices” document, in the
appendix). If, for example, the benefits are $800 million, but enjoyed mostly by
low-income workers, whereas the costs are $900 million, but faced mostly by
consumers generally, it seems reasonable for the agency to go forward, at least if
Congress has not expressly precluded that judgment.
There is a larger point here. In addition to knowing the benefits and costs
of regulation, it is necessary to know who bears those costs and enjoys those
benefits, and also the particular nature of those costs and benefits. Suppose, for
example, that an occupational safety and health regulation would have a total
cost of $600 million, and that the monetized benefits would be $400 million
(including, let us say, 40 lives saved per year, and hence $200 million in
monetized savings from fatalities averted). Is it clear that this regulation should
not go forward? For various reasons it is not. If the people who are saved are
children or teenagers, the uniform lives saved number might undervalue the
relevant benefits. Equally important: What does the $600 million mean,
concretely? Does it mean that prices will increase, by a little, for many people?
See Viscusi, supra note (documenting abuses of this kind).
See the acknowledgement of the relevance of life-years in American Dental Association v.
Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1993).
257 See Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, U Chi L
Rev (forthcoming 2001).
255
256
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That cost might be worth incurring. So too if the consequence of the $600 million
expenditure would be a reduction in annual profits for companies that already
make billions. Or does the cost mean that poor people will lose their jobs? An
ideal cost-benefit analysis would tell us something about the incidence of both
costs and benefits. It makes sense to say that the “bottom line” numbers will not
be decisive when an incidence analysis shows that those numbers should be
adjusted to take account of the identify of the winners and losers. Of course it is
possible to think that we lack the tools to engage in a good incidence analysis, or
that an assessment of distributional issues will be subject to interest-group
manipulation, and hence that the “bottom line” numbers should be used for
pragmatic reasons.258
While these points give agencies a degree of flexibility, they do not give
them carte blanche, because they operate in limited domains, and because they
come with a duty of reasoned explanation. This duty is procedural, but it is far
more than that. In the Corrosion Proof Fittings case, for example, it is hard to see
how the agency could have justified the extreme cost-benefit ratios that applied
to certain bans on asbestos.259
3. The discount rate. Perhaps the most difficult issue here, from the
theoretical point of view, involves the selection of the appropriate discount rate.
How should the agency value future gains and losses? In terms of ultimate
outcomes, the choice matters a great deal. If an agency chooses a discount rate of
2%, the outcome will be very different from what it would be an agency chooses
a discount rate of 10%; the benefits calculation will shift dramatically as a result.
If a human life is valued at $8 million, and if an agency chooses a 10% discount
rate, a life saved 100 years from now is worth only $581.260 “At a discount rate of
five pecent, one death next year counts for more than a billion deaths in 500
years.”261 OMB suggests a 7% discount rate (see Appendix); but this is highly
controversial. A key question is therefore: What legal constraints should be
imposed on the agency’s choice?262

See Viscusi, Risk Equity, supra note.
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
260 See Michael Gerrard, Demons and Anegls in Hazardous Waste Regulation, 92 NW L Rev 706,
742-43 (1998).
261 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 357 (1984).
262 Valuable treatments include Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Col L Rev 941 (1999); Comment, Judicial
Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333 (1998).
258
259
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My basic conclusion is that it is much harder to untangle the theoretical
issue than to identify the appropriate posture of reviewing courts. In this highly
technical area, courts should adopt a posture of deference, requiring agencies
only to produce a reasonable explanation for their choice and to show a degree of
consistency. Part of the reason for deference is the extreme complexity of the
underlying issues. Part of the reason is the risk that an aggressive judicial posture
would contribute to the “ossification” of rulemaking263 -- a particular problem in
this setting, because any particular discount rate will be easy to challenge, with
reasonable arguments suggesting that it is too low or too high.264 To understand
these points, some details are in order.
Usually statutes are silent on the question of appropriate discount rate. In
fact I have been unable to find any statute that specifies a discount rate for
agencies to follow. On judicial review, the question will therefore involve a claim
that the agency’s choice is arbitrary. Here the national government shows
strikingly (and inexplicably) variable practices. As noted, the Office of
Management and Budget suggests a 7% discount rate,265 departing from a 10%
rate in the 1980s.266 But agencies are not bound by OMB guidelines, and they
have ranged from as low as 3% (Food and Drug Administration, Department of
Housing and Urban development ) to as high as 10% (EPA).267 In fact the same
agency sometimes endorses different discount rates for no apparent reason -with EPA, for example, selecting a 3% rate for regulation of lead-based paint as
compared to 7% for regulation of drinking water, and 10% rates, respectively,
for regulation of emissions from locomotives.268 Here government practice seems
extremely erratic.
From the purely economic standpoint, there are serious conundrums
here. The impetus for discounting future effects stems from the judgment that
in the context of money, discounting future benefits and losses is entirely
rational, even simple: A dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.
There are two reasons: investment value (or opportunity cost) and pure time
269

Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 1992 Duke LJ
1385.
264 I am therefore disagreeing with the endorsement of “hard look” review in the excellent
Comment, supra note.
265 See OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53520 (1992).
266 See appendix for details; see also Revesz, supra note, at 950.
267 See Comment, supra note, at 1336-37.
268 Id. at 1337.
269 See id. at 1341-1350; see also Appendix for excerpts from OMB’s own account.
263
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preference.270 A dollar today can be invested, and for this reason it is worth more
than a dollar a year from now. An emphasis on the investment value of money
yields a discount rate of roughly 5%-7%. Quite apart from this point, people
generally seem to have a preference for receiving money sooner rather than later.
People value current consumption more than they value future consumption; for
this reason alone, $1000 is worth more today than it is in a decade. An inquiry
into pure time preference produces discount rates of 1%-3%. Though they lead to
different numbers, both points justify discounting future income gains and
losses.
So far, so good. The problem is that notwithstanding conventional
wisdom among economists, these points are not easily taken to justify a discount
rate for the nonmonetary benefits of regulation (see table 5 for an overview of
such benefits). If a regulation will save ten lives this year, and ten years annually
for the next ten years, it cannot plausibly be urged that the future savings are
worth less than the current savings, on the ground that a current life saved can
be immediately “invested.” The point about investment value, or the
opportunity cost of using capital, seems utterly irrelevant here. With time
preference, things are less clear. Perhaps people would rather save ten lives
today than ten lives in a decade. But it is unclear that this is so; and even if it is,
what moral status would such a time preference have? Almost certainly it makes
sense to say that it would be worse for you to lose your limb now than to lose it
in ten years; in the latter case, you will have ten years of use of the limb. And
probably it makes sense to say that agencies should attend to life-years saved,
not only lives saved. But holding all this constant, the death of a thirty-five year
old in 2004 does not seem worth more than the death of a thirty-five year old in
2044. And since different people are involved, the moral problem is serious: The
preference of the chooser in 2002 is certainly relevant to determining that
chooser’s own fate, and the timing of risks that might come to fruition for that
chooser; but the chooser’s preference cannot easily be used to determine the fate
of someone not yet born.
These points suggest that, as Richard Revesz suggests, it is important to
distinguish two issues that go under the name of “discounting” and that have yet
to be separated in administrative practice: (a) latent harms, in the form of
exposures whose consequences will occur late in someone’s lifetime; and (b)
harms to future generations.271 It is reasonable to say that latent harms should
270
271

Id. at 1341-46.
As argued, convincingly, in Revesz, supra note.
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count for less than immediate ones, since they remove few years from people’s
lives. Some kind of discount rate is sensible here, although OMB’s 7% figure is
probably too high.272 The case of harms to future generations, or people not yet
born, is altogether different, and in that case the usual grounds for discounting
monetary benefits are quite inapplicable. For this reason some people think that
no discounting is appropriate for the nonmonetary benefits of regulation.273 On
this view, a life-year saved is a life-year saved, and it does not matter, for
purposes of valuation, when the saving occurs.
But there is a major objection to this way of proceeding: It would appear
to require truly extraordinary sacrifices from the present for the sake of the
(infinite) future. Perhaps the “failure to discount would leave all generations at a
subsistence level of existence, because benefits would be postponed perpetually
for the future.”274 On the other hand, it is not clear that the assumption behind
this objection is convincing. Technological and other advances made by the
current generation benefit future generations as well, and hence impoverishment
of the current generation would inevitably harm those who will come later.275 In
any case there is a hard ethical question here – how much the current generation
should suffer for the benefit of the future – and a judgment against discounting
would not answer that question unless we were sure that as a matter of policy,
we should be engaging in maximizing some aggregate welfare function.276 It is
not at all clear that this form of maximization is the appropriate choice to make.
At this point it should be clear that these issues are exceedingly complex
and that agencies asked to engage in cost-benefit analysis have no clear path to
an appropriate choice of discount rate. My principal topic, however, is not
regulatory policy, but the implementation of the cost-benefit default principles.
In the face of the underlying conundrums, the most that a reviewing court can
require is a rationale for the agency’s choice that is both articulated and
reasonable. There are several possibilities here,277 suggesting what courts should
and should not do.

See id. at 981-87.
Id. at 987-1009 (offering a qualified version of this view).
274 See David Pearce and R. Kelly Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment
223-24 (1990).
275 Revesz, supra note, at 994.
276 Tyler Cowen and Derek Perfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age
Groups and Generations 149 (Peter Laslett and James Fishkin eds. 1992).
277 For a good discussion, see Daniel Farber, Ecopragmatism (1999).
272
273
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! Courts should not require costs and benefits to have the same discount
rate, at least not if costs are to be absorbed in terms of dollars and
benefits will come in terms of fatalities and illnesses averted. It follows
that in Corrosion Proof Fittings case, the court of appeals was quite
wrong to tell EPA to produce an “apples-to-apples comparison, even if
this entails discounting benefits of a non-monetary nature.”278
! Courts should not simply defer to agency decisions as a “policy
choice,” as did one court in an unusually complex setting.279 What is
necessary is some kind of explanation for the choice.
! Courts should acknowledge that good explanations can be given for a
wide range of choices – between, say, a discount rate of 0% (for future
generations, not latent harms) and 7% (OMB’s suggestion). So long as
the agency gives a sensible rationale and departs from it only on the
basis of articulated reasons, courts should respect the choice. The
value judgments here can be reasonably disputed, and they should be
made democratically, not judicially. It follows that in the context of
discount rates, as elsewhere, the common law of cost-benefit analysis is
to be developed at the administrative level, subject only to judicial
review for reasonableness.
VII.

Conclusion

In this Article I have attempted to identify the cost-benefit default
principles, to defend their use, and to explore their meaning for the future. In the
face of statutory ambiguity, courts are now permitting agencies to refuse to
regulate when a significant risk is not shown; to refuse to regulate beyond the
point where regulation is not feasible; to consider costs; and to engage in a form
of cost-benefit balancing. At their least intrusive, the cost-benefit default rules
allow the agency to go in the suggested direction when the statute is unclear. At
their most intrusive, the principles require the agency to act in the way they
suggest unless Congress has unambiguously said otherwise.
I have argued on behalf of both the least and most intrusive version of the
cost-benefit default rules, by suggesting that they are likely to give sense and
rationality the benefit of the doubt. At the same time, I have urged that the
argument on their behalf is presumptive only, and that in certain contexts,
agencies have good reasons for embarking on a different course. The question is
278
279

Corrosion Proof Fittings, supa note, 947 F.2d at 1218.
880 F 2d at 465.
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whether agencies have been able to suffer a reasonable defense of their decision
to that effect.
I have also attempted to set out some guidelines for the future, both under
the cost-benefit default principles and under statutes that point in the same
direction. It is necessary for agencies to particularize the idea of “significant”
and “de minimis” risks through quantitative guidelines. A large point here is
that the statistical probability of harm is not all that matters; the size of the
exposed population is important as well. “Feasibility” is not an off-on switch,
and here too agencies should specify what they understand the term to mean,
beginning with the admittedly vague notion that massive dislocations would be
both necessary and sufficient to show that regulation is not feasible. We have
seen that with respect to valuation of life and health, market measures can
provide a good start, from which agencies are entitled to make reasonable
adjustments. We have also seen that the most difficult issue involves selection of
the appropriate discount rate. Reviewing courts should not require agencies to
apply the same discount rate to life and health that they apply to money; with
respect to discounting, there are good reasons to distinguish money from other
goods. The most that courts can do is to impose ceilings and floors on agency
judgments, by requiring a good rationale for whatever discount rate is chosen.
The most general conclusion, signaled by the rise of the cost-benefit
default principles, is that the nation is nearing the end of a “first generation”
debate about whether to adopt a presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing,
and rapidly moving into a “second generation” debate about when the
presumption is rebutted, and about what cost-benefit analysis specifically entails.
If cost-benefit analysis is to be defended, it is not because of especially
controversial judgments of value, but because of a belief that regulatory action
should be judged largely in terms of its consequences.280 Suitably specified and
understood, the cost-benefit default principles should be regarded, not as a
technique for stalling desirable regulation, but as a pragmatic effort to ensure
that regulation responds to serious problems rather than to trivial or imaginary
ones. And if they are seen in these terms, the cost-benefit default principles
operate not only a foundation for deterring regulation that promises to do less

Of course there is no way of assessing consequences, or even identifying them, that is entirely
neutral on evaluative questions. What I mean to suggest is that agreed-upon understandings can
do the necessary work here. See the outline of the track record of cost-benefit analysis at EPA,
supra.
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good than harm, but also as a basis for producing regulatory action where an
assessment of the consequences shows that regulation is desirable.281

281

See the account, supra, of instances in which cost-benefit balancing spurred regulatory action.
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Appendix: Excerpts from OMB Guidance on Cost-Benefit Analysis

The following consists of excerpts from OMB’s “best practices” guidelines
for cost-benefit analysis. Because the understanding of cost-benefit analysis is so
much better developed within OMB than within courts and the legal culture, it is
worth attending, with some care, to OMB’s suggestions. I have challenged some
of OMB’s claims – especially on the appropriate discount rate – but there is no
question that OMB has offered a helpful and thoughful treatment of many of the
underlying problems.

January 11, 1996
Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations under Executive Order 12866
III. ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS
...
A. General Principles
3. Discounting. One of the problems that arises in developing a benefitcost analysis is that the benefits and costs often occur in different time periods.
When this occurs, it is not appropriate, when comparing benefits and costs, to
simply add up the benefits and costs accruing over time. Discounting takes
account of the fact that resources (goods or services) that are available in a given
year are worth more than the identical resources available in a later year. One
reason for this is that resources can be invested so as to return more resources
later. In addition, people tend to be impatient and to prefer earlier consumption
over later consumption.
(a) Basic considerations. Constant-dollar benefits and costs must be
discounted to present values before benefits and costs in different years can be
added together to determine overall net benefits. To obtain constant dollar
estimates, benefit and cost streams in nominal dollars should be adjusted to
correct for inflation. The basic guidance on discount rates for regulatory and
other analyses is provided in OMB Circular A-94. The discount rate specified in
that guidance is intended to be an approximation of the opportunity cost of
capital, which is the before-tax rate of return to incremental private investment.
The Circular A-94 rate, which was revised in 1992 based on an extensive review
and public comment, reflects the rates of return on low yielding forms of capital,
such as housing, as well as the higher rates of returns yielded by corporate
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capital. This average rate currently is estimated to be 7 percent in real terms (i.e.,
after adjusting for inflation). . . .
Even those benefits and costs that are hard to quantify in monetary terms
should be discounted.. . . .
(b) Additional considerations. Modern research in economic theory has
established a preferred model for discounting, sometimes referred to as the
shadow price approach. The basic concept is that economic welfare is ultimately
determined by consumption; investment affects welfare only to the extent that it
affects current and future consumption. Thus, any effect that a government
program has on public or private investment must be converted to an associated
stream of effects on consumption before being discounted.
Converting investment-related benefits and costs to their consumptionequivalents as required by this approach involves calculating the "shadow price
of capital." This shadow price reflects the present value of the future changes in
consumption arising from a marginal change in investment, using the
consumption rate of interest (also termed the rate of time preference) as the
discount rate. . . .
4. Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty. . . . Often risks, benefits, and costs
are measured imperfectly because key parameters are not known precisely;
instead, the economic analysis must rely upon statistical probability distributions
for the values of parameters. Both the inherent lack of certainty about the
consequences of a potential hazard (for example, the odds of contracting cancer)
and the lack of complete knowledge about parameter values that define risk
relationships (for example, the relationship between presence of a carcinogen in
the food supply and the rate of absorption of the carcinogen) should be
considered.
...
(a) Risk assessment. . . . Data relating to effects that can be identified may
be sketchy, incomplete, or subject to measurement error or statistical bias.
Exposures and sensitivities to risks may vary considerably across the affected
population. These difficulties can lead, for example, to a range of quantitative
estimates of risk in health and ecological risk assessments that can span several
orders of magnitude. Uncertainties in cost estimates also can be significant, in
particular because of lack of experience with the adjustments that markets can
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make to reduce regulatory burdens, the difficulty of identifying and quantifying
opportunity cost, and the potential for enhanced or retarded technical
innovation. All of these concerns should be reflected in the uncertainties about
outcomes that should be incorporated in the analysis.
The treatment of uncertainty in developing risk, benefit, and cost
information also must be guided by the principles of full disclosure and
transparency, as with other elements of an EA. Data, models, and their
implications for risk assessment should be identified in the risk characterization.
....
In order for the EA to evaluate outcomes involving risks, risk assessments
must provide some estimates of the probability distribution of risks with and
without the regulation. Whenever it is possible to quantitatively characterize the
probability distributions, some estimates of central tendency (e.g., mean and
median) must be provided in addition to ranges, variances, specified low-end
and high-end percentile estimates, and other characteristics of the distribution.
Overall risk estimates cannot be more precise than their most uncertain
component. Thus, risk estimates should be reported in a way that reflects the
degree of uncertainty present in order to prevent creating a false sense of
precision. The accuracy with which quantitative estimates are reported must be
supported by the quality of the data and models used. In all cases, the level of
precision should be stated explicitly.
Overall uncertainty is typically a consequence of uncertainties about many
different factors. Appropriate statistical techniques should be used to combine
uncertainties about separate factors into an overall probability distribution for a
risk. . . .
Uncertainty may arise from a variety of fundamentally different sources,
including lack of data, variability in populations or natural conditions,
limitations in fundamental scientific knowledge (both social and natural)
resulting in lack of knowledge about key relationships, or fundamental
unpredictability of various phenomena. The nature of these different sources
may suggest different approaches. For example, when uncertainty is due to lack
of information, one policy alternative may be to defer action pending further
study. One factor that may help determine whether further study is justifiable as
a policy alternative is an evaluation of the potential benefits of the information
relative to the resources needed to acquire it and the potential costs of delaying
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action. When uncertainty is due largely to observable variability in populations
or natural conditions, one policy alternative may be to refine targeting, that is, to
differentiate policies across key subgroups. Analysis of such policies should
consider the incremental benefits of improved efficiency from targeting, any
incremental costs of monitoring and enforcement, and changes in the
distribution of benefits and costs. . . .
7. Nonmonetized Benefits and Costs. Presentation of monetized benefits
and costs is preferred where acceptable estimates are possible. However,
monetization of some of the effects of regulations is often difficult if not
impossible, and even the quantification of some effects may not be easy. Effects
that cannot be fully monetized or otherwise quantified should be described.
Those effects that can be quantified should be presented along with qualitative
information to characterize effects that are not quantified.
Irrespective of the presentation of monetized benefits and costs, the EA
should present available physical or other quantitative measures of the effects of
the alternative actions to help decisionmakers understand the full effects of
alternative actions. These include the magnitude, timing, and likelihood of
impacts, plus other relevant dimensions (e.g., irreversibility and uniqueness). For
instance, assume the effects of a water quality regulation include increases in fish
populations and habitat over the affected stream segments and that it is not
possible to monetize such effects. It would then be appropriate to describe the
benefits in terms of stream miles of habitat improvement and increases in fish
population by species (as well as to describe the timing and likelihood of such
effects, etc.). . . .
8. Distributional Effects and Equity. Those who bear the costs of a
regulation and those who enjoy its benefits often are not the same people. The
term "distributional effects" refers to the description of the net effects of a
regulatory alternative across the population and economy, divided up in various
ways (e.g., income groups, race, sex, industrial sector). Benefits and costs of a
regulation may be distributed unevenly over time, perhaps spanning several
generations. Distributional effects may also arise through "transfer payments"
arising from a regulatory action. For example, the revenue collected through a
fee, surcharge, or tax (in excess of the cost of any service provided) is a transfer
payments.
Where distributive effects are thought to be important, the effects of
various regulatory alternatives should be described quantitatively to the extent
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possible, including their magnitude, likelihood, and incidence of effects on
particular groups. Agencies should be alert for situations in which regulatory
alternatives result in significant changes in treatment or outcomes for different
groups. Effects on the distribution of income that are transmitted through
changes in market prices can be important, albeit sometimes difficult to assess.
The EA should also present information on the streams of benefits and costs over
time in order to provide a basis for judging intertemporal distributional
consequences, particularly where intergenerational effects are concerned.
There are no generally accepted principles for determining when one
distribution of net benefits is more equitable than another. Thus, the EA should
be careful to describe distributional effects without judging their fairness. These
descriptions should be broad, focusing on large groups with small effects per
capita as well as on small groups experiencing large effects per capita. Equity
issues not related to the distribution of policy effects should be noted when
important and described quantitatively to the extent feasible.
B. Benefit Estimates
...
The calculation of benefits (including benefits of risk reductions) should
reflect the full probability distribution of potential consequences. For example,
extreme safety or health results should be weighted, along with other possible
outcomes, by estimates of their probability of occurrence based on the available
evidence to estimate the expected result of a proposed regulation. To the extent
possible, the probability distributions of benefits should be presented. Extreme
estimates should be presented as complements to central tendency and other
estimates. If fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of knowledge precludes
construction of a scientifically defensible probability distribution, benefits should
be described under plausible alternative assumptions, along with a
characterization of the evidence underlying each alternative view. . . .
1. General Considerations. The concept of "opportunity cost" is the
appropriate construct for valuing both benefits and costs. The principle of
"willingness-to-pay" captures the notion of opportunity cost by providing an
aggregate measure of what individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy a particular
benefit. Market transactions provide the richest data base for estimating benefits
based on willingness-to-pay, as long as the goods and services affected by a
potential regulation are traded in markets. It is more difficult to estimate benefits
where market transactions are difficult to monitor or markets do not exist.
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Regulatory analysts in these cases need to develop appropriate proxies that
simulate market exchange. Indeed, the analytical process of deriving benefit
estimates by simulating markets may suggest alternative regulatory strategies
that create such markets.
Either willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept (WTA) can
provide an appropriate measure of benefits, depending on the allocation of
property rights. The common preference for WTP over WTA measures is based
on the empirical difficulties in estimating the latter. . . .
2. Principles for Valuing Benefits Directly Traded in Markets. Ordinarily,
goods and services are to be valued at their market prices. However, in some
instances, the market value of a good or service may not reflect its true value to
society.
If a regulatory alternative involves changes in such a good or service, its
monetary value for purposes of benefit-cost analysis should be derived using an
estimate of its true value to society (often called its "shadow price"). For example,
suppose a particular air pollutant damages crops. One of the benefits of
controlling that pollutant will be the value of the crop saved as a result of the
controls. That value would typically be determined by reference to the price of
the crop. If, however, the price of that crop is held above the unregulated market
equilibrium price by a government price-support program, an estimate based on
the support price would overstate the value of the benefit of controlling the
pollutant. . . .
In other cases, market prices could understate social values, for example
where production of a particular good also provides opportunities for improving
basic knowledge.
3. Principles for Valuing Benefits That Are Indirectly Traded in Markets. .
..
A variety of methods have been developed for estimating indirectly
traded benefits. Generally, these methods apply statistical techniques to distill
from observable market transactions the portion of willingness-to-pay that can
be attributed to the benefit in question. Examples include estimates of the value
of environmental amenities derived from travel-cost studies, hedonic price
models that measure differences or changes in the value of land, and statistical
studies of occupational-risk premiums in wage rates. For all these methods, care
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is needed in designing protocols for reliably estimating benefits or in adapting
the results of previous studies to new applications. The use of occupational-risk
premiums can be a source of bias because the risks, when recognized, may be
voluntarily rather than involuntarily assumed, and the sample of individuals
upon which premium estimates are based may be skewed toward more risktolerant people.
Contingent-valuation methods have become increasingly common for
estimating indirectly traded benefits, but the reliance of these methods on
hypothetical scenarios and the complexities of the goods being valued by this
technique raise issues about its accuracy in estimating willingness to pay
compared to methods based on (indirect) revealed preferences. Accordingly,
value estimates derived from contingent-valuation studies require greater
analytical care than studies based on observable behavior. For example, the
contingent valuation instrument must portray a realistic choice situation for
respondents -- where the hypothetical choice situation corresponds closely with
the policy context to which the estimates will be applied. The practice of
contingent valuation is rapidly evolving, and agencies relying upon this tool for
valuation should judge the reliability of their benefit estimates using this
technique in light of advances in the state of the art.
4. Principles and Methods for Valuing Goods That Are Not Traded
Directly or Indirectly in Markets. Some types of goods, such as preserving
environmental or cultural amenities apart from their use and direct enjoyment by
people, are not traded directly or indirectly in markets. The practical obstacles to
accurate measurement are similar to (but generally more severe than) those
arising with respect to indirect benefits, principally because there are few or no
related market transactions to provide data for willingness-to-pay estimates.
For many of these goods, particularly goods providing "nonuse" values,
contingent-valuation methods may provide the only analytical approaches
currently available for estimating values. The absence of observable and
replicable behavior with respect to the good in question, combined with the
complex and often unfamiliar nature of the goods being valued, argues for great
care in the design and execution of surveys, rigorous analysis of the results, and
a full characterization of the uncertainties in the estimates to meet best practices
in the use of this method.
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(b) Fatality risks. . . .

Reductions in fatality risks as a result of government action are best
monetized according to the willingness-to-pay approach. . . . Another way of
expressing reductions in fatality risks is in terms of the "value of statistical lifeyears extended" (VSLY). For example, if a regulation protected individuals
whose average remaining life expectancy was 40 years, then a risk reduction of
one fatality would be expressed as 40 life-years extended. This approach allows
distinctions in risk-reduction measures based on their effects on longevity.
However, this does not automatically mean that regulations with greater
numbers of life-years extended will be favored over regulations with fewer
numbers of life-years extended. VSL and VSLY ultimately depend on the
willingness to pay for various forms of mortality risk reduction, not just
longevity considerations.
...
To value reductions in more voluntarily incurred risks (e.g., those related
to motorcycling without a helmet) that are "high," agencies should consider
using lower values than those applied to reductions in involuntary risk. When a
higher-risk option is chosen voluntarily, those who assume the risk may be more
risk-tolerant, i.e., they may place a relatively lower value on avoiding risks.
Empirical studies of risk premiums in higher-risk occupations suggest that
reductions in risks for voluntarily assumed high risk jobs (e.g., above 10-4
annually) are valued less than equal risk reductions for lower-risk jobs.
However, when occupational choices are limited, the occupational risks incurred
may be more involuntary in nature.
C. Cost Estimates . . .
As with benefit estimates, the calculation of costs should reflect the full
probability distribution of potential consequences. Extreme values should be
weighted, along with other possible outcomes, by estimates of their probability
of occurrence based on the available evidence to estimate the expected result of a
proposed regulation. If fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of
knowledge precludes construction of a scientifically defensible probability
distribution, costs should be described under plausible alternative assumptions,
along with a characterization of the evidence underlying each alternative view. .
..
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